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“The correct regulative principle for anything depends on the na-
ture of that thing.”1
INTRODUCTION
The term “cross-border reproductive transactions” refers to the move-
ment of tens of thousands of people, who travel from one country to
purchase reproductive services from suppliers in other countries, in order
to have a child.2 It is estimated that between eleven and fourteen thousand
patients in Europe alone engage in this practice annually.3 Historically,
the phrase ‘medical tourism’ used to refer to the travel of patients from
less-affluent countries seeking better healthcare in countries with superior
healthcare standards. Today, the journey is just as likely to flow in the
opposite direction, as patients travel from industrialized to less affluent
countries seeking more affordable, high-quality treatment or alternative
medicine. Globalization has changed the challenges involved in, and
promises fueling, fertility services markets. In traditional surrogacy, the
surrogate provided both an egg and a womb. With the advancement of
technology, gestational surrogacy enables the transportation of 100 per-
cent of the genetic material, which will determine the physical and bodily
characteristics of the child, from anywhere in the world. Fertilized eggs can
be transferred from anywhere in the world, and any healthy woman can
carry the pregnancy to term, regardless of the child’s genetic
characteristics.
Patients often seek cross-border fertility treatment due to restrictions
on reproductive options in their home state. Sometimes certain categories
of patients are denied access to a particular service by law, usually due to
political, religious, or ethical considerations, or even the need to allocate
resources among medical treatments.4 The collapse of barriers in the era
of globalization has facilitated access to new, exterritorial suppliers of re-
productive services, eggs, and womb services.5 The ease of mobility, the
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 29 (1971).
2. For more definitions of the phenomenon, see Marcia C. Inhorn & Pasquale Patri-
zio, Rethinking Reproductive “Tourism” as Reproductive “Exile”, 92(3) FERTILITY AND STE-
RILITY 904, 904 (2009); Guido Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion,
28 J. MED. ETHICS 337, 337 (2002); Richard F. Storrow, Quest for Conception: Fertility Tour-
ists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 295, 300 (2006). Cf. Kerrie
S. Howze, Medical Tourism – Symptom or Cure?, 41(3) GA. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2007). The
terms “medical tourism” and “health tourism” often refer to treatments that have been
planned in advance to take place outside a patient’s usual place of residence. A “medical
tourist” is one who travels to a foreign country to consume medical services.
3. F. Shenfield et al., Cross-border Reproductive Care in Six European Countries, 25
HUM. REPROD. 1361, 1365 (2010).
4. John Tobin, To Prohibit Or Permit: What Is The (Human) Rights Response To The
Practice Of International Commercial Surrogacy?, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 317, 319 (2014).
5. I have chosen to use a different term, “supplier,” in order to emphasize the com-
mercial, commodified, and industrial aspect of surrogacy and egg sale, and to avoid
camouflaging commercialization in softer terms such as “donor” or “worker.” While “pro-
vider” may be more idiomatically correct, it is used in the professional jargon to describe
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availability of services, the quantity of information available online, and
the possibility of sharing medical knowledge all make the process safer,
more accessible, and easier to implement.
This Article analyzes the phenomenon of cross-border reproductive
transactions specifically between consumers, i.e., aspiring parents from af-
fluent countries and suppliers of reproductive services from lower-middle-
income countries. Lower-middle-income countries, such as Romania in the
case of egg sales, and India and Thailand in the case of surrogacy services
appear to be attractive places to carry out such transactions. They provide
cheap but high-standard private healthcare facilities for consumers from
affluent countries, relatively short wait times, English-speaking providers,
and tourist destinations.6 In Thailand, at least thirty clinics provide full
clinical services for assisted reproduction; though not all serve foreign pa-
tients, the number of foreign-friendly providers has been increasing since
2004, when the Thai government launched a deliberate strategy to en-
courage foreign medical travel to Thailand. The Thai medical tourism in-
dustry was estimated to be worth $4.3 billion USD in 2012.7 The surrogacy
industry in India is also booming. The advantages of cross-border repro-
ductive markets are especially attractive to women who lack other sources
of income. There are more than 600 In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) clinics in
both rural and urban areas throughout India providing an estimated
60,000 assisted reproductive treatments a year.8 The Akanksha clinic in
Anand, for example, was reported to have employed 167 surrogates who
have delivered 216 healthy babies since 2003.9 The surrogacy industry was
estimated to be worth $60 billion USD worldwide in 2008.10 While the
Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) and other institutional actors, which provide
health services to the public. We sometimes forget that surrogacy and egg sale are not just
technological procedures provided by third parties, but involve another woman whose bodily
labor is the “service.” I am not sure that “supplier” faithfully represents their significant and
meaningful role, but I have tried to differentiate it from providers of technological services.
Accordingly, I use the term “consumers” for intended parents, except in relation to recogni-
tion of legal parenthood, for which I use “intended parents.”
6. See Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta, Reproductive Biocrossings: Indian Egg Donors and
Surrogates in the Globalized Fertility Market, 5 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS
25, 32 (2012) (pulling factors to India); Kari Points, Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tour-
ism in India: The Case of Baby Manji, THE KENAN INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIVER-
SITY 1, 3 (2014), http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf.
7. Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra et al., Human Resources for Health in Southeast Asia:
Shortages, Distributional Challenges, and International Trade in Health Services, 377 LANCET
769, 775 (2011).
8. CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD – ETHICAL OR COM-
MERCIAL 23 (2012), http://www.womenleadership.in/Csr/SurrogacyReport.pdf [hereinafter
CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH]; Neeta Lal, Risks Flagged in India’s Fertility Tourism, ASIA
TIMES ONLINE, (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NH01Df01.html.
9. FRANCES WINDDANCE TWINE, OUTSOURCING THE WOMB: RACE, CLASS AND GES-
TATIONAL SURROGACY IN A GLOBAL MARKET 17 (2011).
10. Andrea Whittaker, Cross-Border Assisted Reproduction Care in Asia: Implications
for Access, Equity and Regulations, 19 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 107, 107 (2011). India
and Thailand are major hubs for international assisted reproductive care, although Singa-
pore, Malaysia and South Korea are increasingly important as destinations. Id. at 108. On
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exact size of the medical tourist population is unknown, anecdotal evi-
dence places it in the hundreds of thousands to several millions yearly.11
These markets pose new challenges, demanding a reexamination of global
concepts of justice and responsibility to fit new, modern needs. Ultimately
offering a model for comprehensive regulation, this paper considers which
parties should bear responsibility to ensure proper conduct of the market,
and proper conduct in regards to suppliers of reproductive transactions,
egg sellers and surrogates in particular.
Markets in fertility services can be described, according to Iris Marion
Young, as “structural injustice”, defined as “social processes [that] put
large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or
deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the
same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide
range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities.”12
Fertility transactions often reflect socioeconomic disparities between sup-
pliers and consumers. This inequality is highlighted by many feminist crit-
ics, who argue that reproductive markets reinforce the traditional
hierarchical gendered division of labor based on gender stereotypes. It
strengthens the perception of women as socially inferior to men, and turns
women’s labor into something that is used and controlled by others.13
Gendered inequality is aggravated by the structural injustice between con-
sumers from affluent countries and suppliers from lower-middle-income
countries. The current situation reflects a lack of economic power of
women suppliers of reproductive services and results in the infringement
of their rights. Structural injustice cannot be understood in light of private
transactions alone, but must be understood as part of a systemic practice—
an entire industry that relies on women living in circumstances of social
inequality.
The need to remedy structural injustice is clear. To date, proposals for
regulation have been sparse. Most have focused on the interests of chil-
dren and aspiring parents, and are insufficiently attentive to the interests
cross-border reproductive transactions as an industry, see generally Katarina Trimmings &
Paul Beaumont, General Report on Surrogacy, 12 INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 439,
444 (Katarina Trimmings & Paul Beaumont eds., 2013) [hereinafter INT’L SURROGACY AR-
RANGEMENTS] (discussing cross-border reproductive transactions as an industry including
commercial surrogacy in India).
11. Raywat Deonandan, Recent Trends in Reproductive Tourism and International
Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations and Challenges for Policy, 8 RISK MANAGEMENT &
HEALTHCARE POL’Y 111 (2015).
12. Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,
23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, 102, 114 (2006).
13. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE 117, 127-132 (2010).
See also Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach to
Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory, 84 KY.
L.J. 1197, 1211 (1995); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 14 (1996) (“Often they [reproductive technologies]
treat the woman as a reproductive vessel to produce or serve the interests of males and the
state in healthy offspring.”).
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of suppliers of fertility services. Moreover, such proposed reforms are
often abstract and difficult to implement, as they merely recommend inter-
national regulation or unilateral action, both of which, this paper argues,
seem insufficient.
No universal expression of reproductive justice currently exists. Draft-
ing universal rules might be difficult, especially with regard to the issues of
reproduction, family, and parenthood, which are personal, social, and cul-
tural issues and thus vary widely from state to state.14 Moreover, universal
regulation of cross-border reproductive transactions would probably be
more attractive to states that accept some sort of commercialization of
reproductive services, even if with heavy restrictions. Politically, it would
be hard for countries that nationally completely ban the supply of repro-
ductive services to regulate a cross-border market that they consider in-
trinsically unethical.15 These countries would find it difficult to collaborate
with any international norm that does not condemn the procedure. Other
countries could agree on a general understanding regarding relevant
human rights, such as requirements of proper medical standards and the
demand for informed consent, but it remains unclear whether this com-
mon ground could meaningfully extend the principles of reproductive jus-
tice above a minimal human rights threshold. This reality reflects a lack of
consensus in a pluralistic world.
In light of the right to sovereign self-determination to regulate accord-
ing to national values,16 I will first consider the independent responsibili-
ties of states. Strong concerns regarding the morality of consumers’ states’
policies arise when their reproductive policy in the domestic sphere is in-
consistent with their policy in the international sphere. Many countries
ban or restrict the commercial provision of reproductive services in their
territory, yet, when their citizens buy these services across the border,
these states’ laws and policies approve of market transactions that would
be considered illegitimate domestically by acknowledging parent-child re-
lations and granting entry visas or citizenship to the resulting child. I will
argue that a national-international consistency model, which requires con-
sistency between each state’s domestic and global policies, could be suffi-
cient to overcome this moral problem. Yet, as will be shown, even if states’
policies exhibit such consistency, unilateral action on their part is insuffi-
cient to ensure coherent ethical regulation, to guarantee a proper way of
conduct, or to sufficiently protect the suppliers of reproductive services. It
may imply good intentions on the part of states, but it will not remedy the
negative implications of cross-border reproductive markets. Since unilat-
14. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 79 (1983).
15. Tobin, supra note 4, at 344.
16. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 296 (2013). For more on the pursuit of
national interest as a moral duty as well as political necessity, see Hans J. Morgenthau, The
Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions, 44
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 833, 854 (1950).
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eral action is insufficient, I propose what I believe is a transformative
model for regulating cross-border reproductive transactions through
shared responsibility.
This paper proposes an applicable shared responsibility model for reg-
ulation, based on the model suggested by Young and Barry that makes it
possible to assign duties to all involved according to measures of each
party’s entanglement in the unjust structure and their ability to remedy
it.17 This is arguably the first model that is attentive to all aspects of the
phenomenon and that offers a multileveled system of regulation, including
unilateral, transnational and international aspects, as well as new collabo-
rations between actors. It suggests some remedies for exploitative transac-
tions, but also aims to correct the structure of injustice that sustains the
inequalities present in cross-border markets.
I will outline the parameters of the shared responsibility structure, in-
cluding engaging and assigning parameters. Engaging parameters deter-
mine who the responsible actors are, and the extent to which they have
contributed to bringing about an unjust situation. Assigning parameters
delegate actors different kinds of duties based on the way each actor is
connected to the others, the power relations among different positions,
and the areas where actors have the capacity to change. My research iden-
tifies four focal points for addressing cross-border reproductive transac-
tions in order to minimize the negative impacts on consumers, suppliers,
resulting children, and their states: (1) joint action regarding legal
parenthood and the nationality of the child, (2) ensuring universal norms
of proper medical standards, (3) contractually avoiding violation of
women’s and children’s rights and ensuring more equitable division of the
benefits from these transactions, and, (4) a general global commitment to
the reduction of poverty through the empowerment and capacity building
of the poor.
In order to see whether a unilateral action of a consumer state could
cure some of the wrongs in cross-border reproductive transactions, the ar-
ticle first examines the sufficiency of unilateral action. The second part
elaborates on the regulative mechanism of a shared responsibility model.
The third part specifies what action each actor would be expected to take
as part of the joint action in order to comply with the recommendations
and promote more desirable transactions. The paper then reviews these
recommendations in light of an Israeli case study.
I. NATIONAL MORALITY – NATIONAL-INTERNATIONAL
CONSISTENCY MODEL
Under the current legal situation, consumer countries are exempt
from any legal obligation toward foreign suppliers. Strong concerns re-
garding a double standard arise when a consumers’ states’ domestic policy
17. Christian Barry, Global Justice: Aims, Arrangements, and Responsibilities, in CAN
INSTITUTIONS HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES? COLLECTIVE MORAL AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 218 (Toni Erskine ed., 2004); Young, supra note 12.
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regarding reproductive transactions is inconsistent with their policy re-
garding such transactions in the international sphere. States have the free-
dom to choose reproductive policies that express the price society is
willing (or unwilling) to pay in exchange for having children through cross-
border transactions, in accordance with their national moral and political
values. National policies are traditionally applied within the context of the
territorial state and limited to this territory. States are free to have differ-
ent, independent policies, not necessarily compatible with the norms of
other states, free from any moral judgment of the international community
on their choice to support or not support commercial provision of repro-
ductive services.18 In the absence of international regulation regarding fer-
tility treatments, states are neither subject to international schemes of
regulation, nor committed to ensuring that their own domestic norms reg-
ulating the subject are nationally and internationally consistent.
Moral considerations for global and domestic transactions for repro-
ductive services bear strong similarities. Both solve the problem of the
same consumer, using the same practice, with the help of either a local or
foreign supplier. Ethically, unless we can justify a moral difference be-
tween the national and international contexts, some consistency should be
maintained between the national and international definitions of proper
conduct. Many national justifications for restricting eligibility for repro-
ductive services should be relevant when transactions cross borders. For
example, if the reason that reproductive transactions are restricted is that
certain transactions are wrong or immoral, then since the underlying sub-
ject of the transaction is the same, the moral evaluation should be the
same: the act would be judged immoral whether the supplier is local or
foreign. If the reason for restricting eligibility is to protect domestic suppli-
ers from potential exploitation or violation of human rights, then in order
to deny foreign suppliers their entitlement to the same rights, we must
show that differences between the domestic and international contexts de-
mand different standards. Unless the mere existence of a border justifies
different ethical values, it is hard to imagine how moral considerations
regarding cross-border reproductive transactions might change.
However, not all legislation expresses national-international norma-
tive consistency. On the contrary, many countries ban or restrict the com-
mercial provision of reproductive services in their territory, yet when their
citizens buy these services across the border, these states’ laws and policies
approve of market transactions (that would be considered illegitimate do-
mestically) by acknowledging parent-child relations and granting entry
visas or citizenship to the resulting child.19 For example, in spite of the
domestic ban on commercial surrogacy in the UK, since a court-approved
“parental order” is required, in practice courts have recognized the
parenthood of consumers who paid “significant” amounts for a commer-
18. JOHN CHARVET & ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 59 (2008).
19. INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9, at 514-18.
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cial surrogacy (that are illegal in the UK) in at least in two cases (where
surrogacy took place in the Ukraine and in California).20 Germany,
France, Holland, and New Zealand demonstrate a similar inconsistency by
nationally restricting or banning commercial surrogacy,21 but accepting
the results of cross-border reproductive transactions through acknowl-
edgement of the legal parenthood and nationality of the resulting
children.22
The same is true with the sale of eggs. The Italian government stated
that the reasons for enacting the ban on donor gametes are to affirm that
heterosexual couples are the only appropriate type of family formation
and that it fears harm to the children and society if homosexual families
were condoned.23 Based on this reasoning, the Italian government should
have an interest in preventing such transactions across the border as well,
or at least in reducing them, as this moral interdiction does not change
whether the child is a result of a domestic or foreign gamete. Nevertheless,
in spite of potential “harms to the children and society,” the law does not
impose any difficulties on couples who purchase a foreign third-party
gamete.
While consumers’ countries may not take responsibility for private
transactions that their citizens make overseas, their policies affect the mar-
ket. According to Eyal Benvenisti’s model, when deciding whether to al-
low the supply of reproductive services domestically, states have a duty to
weigh the interests of foreign stakeholders if it is within their power to do
so.24 How should they do it?
First, they should respect, to some extent, the principle of proportion-
ality in policymaking. Consumers’ states should do everything in their
20. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, c. 22, § 54(8) (Eng.) enables courts
to consider whether no money or other benefit (other than for expenses reasonably incurred)
has been given or received by either of the applicants when authorizing a parental order. See
Denis Campbell, Couples Who Pay Surrogate Mothers Could Lose Right to Raise the Child,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/apr/05/surrogacy-parents-
ivf.
21. For Germany, see Embryonenschutzgesetz [ESchG] [The Embryo Protection Act]
Dec. 13, 1990 art. 1(1) No.1 & 2 (Ger.); For the Netherlands, see arts. 151b, 273f, Wetboek
van Strafrecht (Sr.); For New Zealand, see Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act
2004, s 14, sub 3 (N.Z.); For France, see Loi 94-653 du 29 July 1994 de Code Penal [Law 94-
653 of July 29, 1994 of Penal Code] art. 227-12, Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Franc¸aise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Sept. 19, 2000.
22. For acknowledgement of parenthood in spite of the public policy, in Germany see
Susann L Gossl, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9,
131, 140; in the Netherlands see Ian Curry-Sumner & Machteld Vonk, The Netherlands, in
INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9, 273, 287; in New Zealand, see
Claire Achmad, New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note
9, 295, 307-308; in France see Louis Perreau-Saussine & Nicolas Sauvage, France, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9, 119, 122.
23. Storrow, supra note 2, at 306-07.
24. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 297.
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power to avoid passing on negative externalities to other countries.25 Not
every self-interested action is equally socially acceptable to the pantheon
of nations, and not every domestic policy is proportional. Proportionality
places limits on legislative power, requiring that laws addressing matters of
great human importance—like reproduction—be carefully considered and
that the least intrusive means for achieving the objective be used.26 This
duty obliges states to be attentive to interests of foreigners as well, and
express those interests within policies. Regarding domestic transactions, a
state may legitimately decide to ban all forms of assisted reproduction, but
once it permits some forms, it should do so on a nondiscriminatory basis.
In cases where some groups are allowed service and others are denied, the
principle of proportionality may be good justification with which to de-
mand equality under the national provision, since national provision could
be better controlled when nationally regulated and would reduce cross-
border transactions and the concerns of exploitation.27
Alternatively, states may be required to consider the eligibility of citi-
zens for adoption arrangements, or at least to provide incentives and infor-
mation regarding adoption similar to what they offer regarding medical
options that may encourage social parenthood through adoption rather
than biological measures requiring eggs and/or surrogacy services.28 Pro-
viding medical solutions but not social ones may incentivize couples to
pursue a path that cannot be considered the “least intrusive means” possi-
ble to achieve parenthood.
Consumers’ states have a further opportunity to influence demand in
the market when deciding if and how to recognize the consequences of
cross-border reproductive transactions. In order to satisfy the ethical de-
mand for consistency, states could ensure that the transactions made by
25. On proportional measures according to state policy, see id. at 542 (mentioning that
in making this assessment, courts consider various factors such as the importance of the legis-
lation to the state, the prevalence of similar laws in other jurisdictions, the likelihood of
conflict with other states’ laws, and the extent of the connections between the offence, the
parties responsible for the offence, and the regulating state); Tobin, supra note 4, at 325.
26. On proportionality, see Richard F. Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacher-
ous Terrain: The Legal Hazards of Cross-Border Reproductive Travel, 23 REPROD. BIOMED.
ONLINE 538, 540 (2011).
27. See, e.g., S.H. and Others v. Austria, 2011-v Eur. Ct .H.R. 297, 328 (2010) (recog-
nizing a similar conclusion when a petition against Austria challenged the ban on any use of
gamete donations for IVF. The purpose of the ban was to prevent the exploitation of egg
providers and the discriminatory selection of embryos based on genetic traits. Balancing
these interests against competing interests, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
although the motivation for this prohibition was, among other things, the protection of egg
suppliers, the decision should be subject to developments which the legislature would have to
take into account in the future, or else it would be disproportionate.); Pennings, supra note 2,
at 338 (offering to abolish all forms of restrictive and coercive legislation as the easiest way to
minimize the travel out of the country); Tobin, supra note 4, at 349.
28. See, e.g., Peter J Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Op-
tions, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1215, 1232 (1997) (suggesting that adoption and incen-
tives that drive people to use medical options rather than pursue social parenthood should be
reconsidered).
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their citizens are consistent with their domestic (proportional) normative
commitments and derive from their own domestic political morality.
Whatever values a state chooses to adopt through national law, believing
them to be normatively preferable, should be reflected in its citizens’ con-
duct in the global sphere. If the state bans markets in reproductive ser-
vices, it should refuse to acknowledge transactions that its citizens make
with foreign suppliers; if surrogacy arrangements are domestically justified
only under certain conditions and standards, the approval of foreign trans-
actions should be limited only to transactions that follow those
standards.29
Before evaluating whether this is indeed a desirable model, I will con-
sider the legal tools needed for the execution of this idea.30 As a unilateral
step, there are two legal tools that could express the commitment of con-
sumers’ states to their national values and standards in a consistent way:
criminalizing actions they disapprove of and conditioning the registration
of children on transactions being made under satisfactory standards. I will
argue that these unilateral tools are insufficient on their own to remedy
structural injustice.
1. Criminalization and Extraterritoriality
Societies sometimes ban the sale of goods whose supply they wish to
discourage, even if the market could be an efficient instrument for the
distribution of these goods.31 Some states nationally criminalize different
aspects of egg donation or surrogacy. Laws sometimes criminalize consum-
ers for purchasing these services (for example, France and New Zea-
land),32 impose civil liability, or criminalize actions taken by physicians or
mediators who assist or advise patients (for example, France, Germany
and South Africa).33 According to the rationale of consistency (see supra,
Section I), a state that bans an act domestically would be required to
criminalize the same act performed across the border.
Extraterritoriality permits a state to prosecute its citizens for activities
undertaken overseas. It may do so under the protective or security princi-
ple, the passive personality principle, or the nationality principle.34 Never-
theless, it is doubtful whether reproduction-related issues can be justified
as subjects of extraterritoriality. According to the protective principle (or
the objective territorial principle), a state may criminalize acts committed
abroad by a foreigner whose actions overseas have deleterious conse-
29. See infra Conditional Recognition, Section I.2.
30. For advantages and disadvantages, see infra, sec. I.3.
31. SATZ, supra note 13, at 189.
32. See CODE PE´NAL [C. PE´N] [PENAL CODE] art. 227-12 (Fr.); For New Zealand, see
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 14(3) (N.Z.).
33. INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9, at 464; Storrow, supra note 26,
at 539.
34. See Ian Brownlie & Kathleen Baker, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
457-64 (James Crawford, 5th ed. 1998) (elaborating on the extraterritoriality principle).
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quences within the state.35 It is hard to justify criminalization of reproduc-
tive transactions on the basis of state security, but harmful effects
domestically may be considered. However, as long as the categorical
harms of these reproductive procedures are debatable, and there is a po-
tentially acceptable way to perform these practices, there is no moral
ground for the radical application of the extraterritorial protective princi-
ple.36 The second principle, the passive personality principle, is used to
assert jurisdiction over persons who harm a state’s nationals living
abroad.37 The passive personality crime is irrelevant since no crime is com-
mitted against consumers. If anything, it is consumers who are fueling the
market in which the offenses are occurring.
However, the third principle, the nationality principle (or active per-
sonality principle) prescribes jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
actor and could be applicable to reproductive issues. This method is al-
ready being used to condemn severe behavior of citizens especially against
foreign children,38 and could be used in countries where commercial re-
production seems extremely immoral. For example, in 2010, Item 231 of
the Turkish Penal Code was instituted, banning cross-border transactions
involving third-party donation of sperm or eggs, on the grounds that it is
illegal to “change or obscure a child’s ancestry.”39 Turkey consistently ap-
plies this morality wherever Turkish citizens make use of a third party’s
gamete, nationally or internationally, and criminalizes citizens who acquire
gametes, as well as mediators, physicians and donors who assist Turkish
reproductive travelers.40 Two Australian states, New South Wales41 and
Queensland,42 have also criminalized resident involvement in any com-
mercial surrogacy arrangements, including overseas activity, reflecting a
consistency with state laws that only allow altruistic surrogacy.43
35. Storrow, supra note 25, at 542.
36. Wannes Van Hoof & Guido Pennings, Extraterritoriality for Cross-Border Repro-
ductive Care: Should States Act Against Citizens Travelling Abroad for Illegal Infertility Treat-
ment?, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 546, 551 (2011).
37. Storrow, supra note 26, at 542.
38. The Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, in an effort to fight
child sex tourism; or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, with regard to extraterritorial crimes in many states.
39. Whittaker, supra note 10, at 113.
40. Bulent Urman & Kayhan Yakin, New Turkish Legislation on Assisted Reproduc-
tive Techniques and Centres: A Step in the Right Direction?, 21 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE
729, 730 (2010).
41. Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) S 11 (Austl.).
42. Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) S 54 (Austl.).
43. Jenni Millbank, The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious Regula-
tion or ‘25 Brick Walls’?, 35 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 165, 185-86 (2011); Richard F. Stor-
row, The Proportionality Problem in Cross-Border Reproductive Care, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 129-30 (Cohen, I. Glenn
ed., 2013). See also infra, the Israeli Bill, sec. III.4.
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There are a few problems with the nationality principle. First, some
states limit the extraterritorial criminal laws only to specific crimes such as
homicide, sedition, or treason.44 Second, it usually requires double crimi-
nality, meaning that the offense has to also be an offense in the foreign
jurisdiction.45 But destination states, being chosen for their permissive reg-
ulation of the supply to foreign consumers, are exactly those states that do
not ban the industry. Thus, it is harder to justify interventions that conflict
with the sovereignty of the destination country in which such activities are
legal.46 Third, enforcement of offenses such as the purchase of eggs
abroad is almost impossible, since proving the offense was committed
would require a physical inspection of pregnancy or invasive procedures
upon the return of consumers to their country.47 Such inspections violate
citizens’ bodily rights, their reproductive health rights, and their privacy
rights. Preventing travel has been suggested as an alternative to criminaliz-
ing the transaction. However, it seems to disproportionately violate the
freedom of movement and faces practical enforcement difficulties.48 It is
doubtful whether the state can justify restricting the travel of citizens to
privately purchase reproductive technologies in other countries, especially
where it is legal. Considering that this is a private decision regarding the
personal family sphere and that their right to reproduce is not fulfilled
within the state, consumers are entitled to privately decide on these mat-
ters.49 The criminalization of consumers might further socially exclude the
44. Storrow, supra note 26, at 542; UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW,
2004-5 HC 5-1, ¶ 383 (UK).
45. Storrow, supra note 26, at 542.
46. Glenn I. Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism (and Why it Matters for
Bioethics), 12 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 9, 20 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, How to Regulate
Medical Tourism]; Van Hoof & Pennings, supra note 36, at 550.
47. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to
Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 458
(1992) (discussing the case of the guarded German border and forced gynecological examina-
tions upon women reentering Germany at the Dutch border in search of evidence of extra-
territorial abortions, and the bringing of criminal charges against women who obtained
abortions in other countries). The European parliament condemned these practices in 1991.
Id. at n.23.
48. Van Hoof & Pennings, supra note 36, at 551. See also Rick Lawson, The Irish
Abortion Cases: European Limits to National Sovereignty, 1 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 167, 175
(1994) (reporting a case in which an Irish 14-year old rape victim was restrained from leaving
Ireland for nine months in order to prevent her from obtaining an abortion in Great Britain
in 1992. This injunction was later overturned, with the statement that the restraint imposed
on the applicants was disproportionate to the aims pursued, and that the freedom to obtain
and make available information relating to services lawfully available in another state could
not be restricted. It hasn’t changed the ban on abortion.).
49. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1, 47-48 (2011) [hereinafter Cohen, Medical Tourism and Global Justice] (arguing
that when people pay out-of-pocket for medical (not reproductive) services, for the state to
restrict them from doing so appears less convincing, especially if this is their only way to get
the service). I think that cross-border reproductive transactions, which involve another per-
son, rather than simply medical devices, raise different considerations regarding the interven-
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infertile, adding criminal stigma to their suffering and causing further pro-
test on behalf of consumers.50
Instead of criminalizing consumers, we might consider criminalizing
the professionals who assist consumers, or criminalizing the mediators who
perform certain procedures domestically. But this would also be hard to
justify. Practically, physicians from consumers’ countries sometimes per-
form the procedures in destination countries, as we learned in 2009, when
Romania charged several Israeli professionals with engaging in the egg
trade after buying human eggs from local women and implanting them in
Israeli women. In this example, the physicians’ actions were in violation of
Romanian law that prohibits payment for human ova and organs, there-
fore the destination country (Romania) pressed charges, not Israel.51 Or-
gan trade is serious enough and would probably be an offense even in
destination states that have permissive regulation. However, when certain
acts are considered lawful in the destination state, or if doctors do not
perform the procedure themselves but merely recommend the option to
consumers, extraterritorial criminalization of physicians would be
unjustifiable.
The criminalization of mediators imposes the risk that such practices
might appear in the black market, which would worsen the position of
suppliers due to lower standards and the lack of monitoring. Moreover,
the mediators are not necessarily within consumers’ states’ jurisdiction.
Many foreign mediators work online outside the scope of consumers’
states’ jurisdiction and may act in accordance with their own domestic
laws. Eventually, scholars argue, all attempts to impose criminal prohibi-
tions are doomed to fail and are mainly symbolic.52
2. Conditional Recognition
Lack of harmonization between countries with regard to the registra-
tion of the legal parenthood and nationality of the child raises administra-
tive opportunities for consumers, but also difficulties. Conditional
registration as a legal monitoring tool relates specifically to surrogacy
transactions, rather than to egg sale, since it occurs when intended parents
return to their home country with a new baby. Nationally, all states have
citizenship laws, which as a default acknowledge the citizenship of their
tion of states, which change the normative conclusion, although criminalization certainly is
not the best method.
50. Whittaker, supra note 10, at 113.
51. Michal Nahman, Reverse Traffic: Intersecting Inequalities in Human Egg Donation,
23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 626, 629 (2011).
52. Compare INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 442 with UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT POLICY (UNDP) GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW:
RISKS, RIGHTS AND HEALTH 7 (2012), http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/
FinalReport-Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf (stating that the approach to tackling HIV, con-
demning the use of punitive laws and instead encouraging the promotion of human rights).
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citizens’ offspring.53 However, most countries, including many destination
countries, grant parenthood to the woman who gives birth.54 In these
cases, the legal parenthood of intended parents must either be acquired
when they return to their home country, or is established in the state of
birth and then confirmed by the consumers’ state.55 When such transac-
tions are inconsistent with national policies, states can either impose diffi-
culties on returning citizens by refusing to issue a passport or visa to the
child, or grant citizenship. Problems may arise when the child needs travel-
ing documents and the legal parenthood of the intended parents is yet to
be determined,56 or when the consumers’ state refuses to recognize a for-
eign legal action relinquishing the surrogate of her parental rights in desti-
nation countries (a birth certificate or court order regarding the legal
parents).57 Yet, many states that ban or restrict commercial surrogacy
choose to recognize the outcomes of cross-border transactions, even when
they are inconsistent with domestic policies regarding commercial surro-
gacy. They settle for some proof of the genetic connection between the
resulting child and at least one of the intended parents.58
Conditional registration can be used to enable consumers’ countries to
efficiently monitor the contracts. The state’s role in acknowledging legal
parenthood or nationality can ensure that children born through surrogate
contracts are only registered if these contracts are sufficiently in accor-
dance with national values and standards. In line with the national-inter-
national consistency demand, this is only an option for states that enable
the provision of eggs or surrogacy services domestically.
53. For different methods of regulating nationality, see PERMANENT BUREAU, A PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT ON THE ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGE-
MENTS 22, 24 (2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012pd10en.pdf. For different
methods of regulating parentage determination, see id. at 20; Karen Busby, Of Surrogate
Mother Born: Parentage Determinations in Canada and Elsewhere, 25 CAN. J. WOMEN & L.
REVUE FEMMES ET DROIT 284 (2013).
54. For exceptions, see El Codigo Civil de Tabasco [CCiv] [Civil Code] art. 347 (Mex.);
Ukraine. The family code of Ukraine art. 123(2) (Ukr.) (intended mother is considered to be
the legal mother).
55. INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 503-504, 510.
56. Richard F. Storrow, Travel into the Future of Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC
L. REV. 295, 305-06 (2010) (“Citizens of several European and Asian countries, including the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Japan have been refused travel doc-
uments for their children by consular officials upon suspicion that the children were the re-
sult of international commercial surrogacy.”); INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra
note 10, at 506-09.
57. Storrow, supra note 26, at 543. See, e.g. Gerd Verschelden & Jinske Verhellen,
Belgium, in INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 49, supra note 10, at 68-69; Louis Perreau-
Saussine & Nicolas Sauvage, France, in INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 122, supra note
10, at 122-23; Marcelo de Alcantara, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGE-
MENTS 247, supra note 10, at 250-51; Ian Curry-Sumner and Machteld Vonk, The Netherlands,
in INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 273, supra note 10, at 292-93.
58. INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 514-18.
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Indeed, several cases have challenged patterns of kinship and status in
the cross-border context.59 A representative case is that of the baby Manji
(2008). It involved Japanese parents transacting in India. According to In-
dian law, a birth certificate requires the names of both mother and father.
In Manji’s case, a month before the baby was born, the intended parents,
the Yamadas, divorced. The courts have been unable to make a clear state-
ment regarding who is to be deemed the baby’s mother, because the con-
tract was not legally binding with regard to parental responsibilities.60
Yamada’s ex-wife (the intended mother) refused to travel with him to take
possession of Manji. The anonymous egg donor (the genetic mother) had
neither rights nor responsibilities toward the baby. The responsibility of
Mehta (the gestational mother) ended when the baby was born, after she
had relinquished her rights. Eventually, the Rajasthan regional passport
office issued Manji an identity certificate as part of a transit document.
The certificate did not mention nationality, mother’s name or religion, and
it was valid only for the travel to Japan. It was the first such identity certifi-
cate issued by the Indian government to a surrogate child born in India.
Japanese authorities stated that Manji could become a Japanese citizen
“once a parent-child relationship has been established, either by the man
recognizing his paternity or through him adopting her.”61 In spite of his
genetic ties to her father, at this time there is still no evidence regarding
the legal recognition of baby Manji’s status by the state.62
The lesson to be learned from the Manji case is that the conditional
registration tool is no less problematic than criminalization. First, since in
many cases of cross-border transactions the fathers are genetically con-
nected to the children, it would be hard to justify not acknowledging par-
ent-child relationships even if the surrogacy was unethical, especially in
countries in which the parenthood of the father is genetically grounded.63
Genetic connection, which is the common grounds for granting a parental
order, is independent of the ethical or legal consideration regarding the
procedure.
Second, conditional registration could end in infringement of the
child’s rights. States must ensure that their national law is in accordance
with their obligations according to the human rights regime. As part of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child,64 any child has a right to be regis-
59. See, e.g., Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: Interna-
tional Surrogacy between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 62-67 (2008).
60. Points, supra note 6, at 5-7.
61. Id. at 6-7 (“[N]early a year after her birth, no evidence had surfaced that Baby
Manji’s legal status in Japan had changed.”).
62. Trisha A. Wolf, Comment, Why Japan Should Legalize Surrogacy, 23 PAC. RIM L.
& POL’Y J. 461, 475 (2014).
63. In many states, intended fathers are acknowledged on genetic grounds. Trimmings
& Beaumont, supra note 10, at 506-07, 519. Often in these countries the intended mother has
to adopt because the registered mother in the birth certificate is the surrogate.
64. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter
Convention on the Rights of the Child].
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tered immediately after birth (art. 7), to preserve his or her identity, in-
cluding nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law,
without unlawful interference (art. 8), to enter their own country with his
or her parents (art. 10), and not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his or her privacy and family (art. 16). The Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness states that a Contracting State shall
grant its nationality to a person, not born in the territory of a Contracting
State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of one of his
parents at the time of the person’s birth was that of that State (art. 4).65
According to this convention, a state may refuse to register a child who is
registered in the destination country or in another country. Such a refusal
will not leave the child stateless, and will not necessarily be considered a
violation of human rights.66 However, when the citizenship laws in desti-
nation states do not grant citizenship to the child (e.g., in Russia), a refusal
by consumers’ countries to register the child might violate the child’s right
to citizenship. Aside from all the above mentioned considerations, refus-
ing to register children born out of cross-border surrogacy transactions
would discriminate against these children compared to other genetically
connected children, which is a violation of the convention on the Rights of
the Child, and a disproportionally harsh response.67
To conclude, the underlying purpose behind conditional registration is
usually deterrence—to prevent future traveling. However, it is doubtful
that this purpose could be achieved through conditional registration, since
usually the international obligation to secure the rights and interests of a
particular child68 outweighs public policy considerations and strict safety
rules.69 Ultimately, many cases that were put to this test resulted in states
allowing registration in spite of procedures that did not align with their
own values, and/or regardless of the ethical considerations concerning the
65. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 4, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S.
175.
66. Yasmine Ergas, Thinking ‘Through’ Human Rights: The Need for a Human Rights
Perspective With Respect to the Regulation of Cross-border Reproductive Surrogacy, in INT’L
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 430-31. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] (Arret Mennesson) 1re civ., Apr. 6, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No.
370 (Fr.) Twins were brought from California by their French parents. The transcription of
their birth certificates had been initially allowed but subsequently annulled. Since the French
provision did not cancel the Californian recognition of the children’s filiation nor prohibit
them from living with the intended parents, it was not considered a violation of their family
rights, or against their best interests.
67. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 64, art. 2.
68. Id. art. 3. See Millbank, supra note 43, at 197 (doubting whether the categorical
exclusion of children born through paid surrogacy from legal parentage is sufficiently justi-
fied or effective).
69. See Mennesson v. France, Application n. 65192/11, Judgment 26 June 2014. Judg-
ment of the Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights; Labassee v. France, Ap-
plication n. 65941/11, Judgment 26 June 2014. Judgment of the Fifth Section of the European
Court of Human Rights; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Application n. 25358/12, Judgment
27 January 2015. Judgment of the Twelfth Section of the European Court of Human Rights.
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specific transactions.70 The processes of granting legal parenthood and na-
tionality increases inconsistency rather than minimize it. As long as the
intended parents can get a child, imposing administrative difficulties will
not necessarily deter future transactions, thus the effectiveness of this tool
in ensuring ethical conduct of the market is questionable.71
3. National-International Consistency Model –
Advantages and Disadvantages
A national-international consistency model is appealing. First, the de-
mand for consistency has a strong normative base. It strengthens the view
that the legitimacy of all state action, both domestic and international, de-
rives from the same set of national core political principles. Whether a
state has the authority to act in an international context must be justified
normatively as part of a political theory that grants it sovereignty, and
legitimized through domestic politics even when actions are performed be-
yond the border.72 Consistency would allow consumers’ states to adhere to
their own moral systems and support national and socially based values by
maintaining a moral-normative coherency between domestic and interna-
tional policies. It can be established without a global normative consensus
on what the right conception of justice is in matters of reproduction, fam-
ily, assisted reproduction, bodily labor, or similar concerns. It can even be
established without formal global institutions.73 Consistent regulation can
serve as an incentive to raise the medical standards in destination states
that have relatively low standards. If the latter wanted to conduct transac-
tions with foreign consumers from states with higher standards, destina-
tion countries would be obliged to measure up to higher normative
demands and raise the threshold for acceptable terms of contracts in order
for consumers’ countries to register children born through safe and ethical
contracts.
70. See, e.g., X & Y (foreign surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 24 (fam) (U.K.); Ellison
and Anor & Karnchanit, [2012] FamCA 602, para. 87 (AU) (acknowledging parentage as
being in the best interests of the children, and stating it was too late to inquire into the
legality of the arrangement); Tian v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLii
75008 (Can. B.C) (The Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) noted that the payment may have
exceeded the surrogate’s reasonable expenses and that the surrogacy is “likely” contrary to
the laws of both Canada and China, but this finding had no impact on the decision.); Claire
Achmad, New Zealand, INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 9, at 308-09 (report-
ing a case (KR and DGR) in which the court claimed that policy considerations are not part
of its authority and did not consider the way the procedure had been conducted abroad, and
another case (BWS) in which the court acknowledged the consent of the surrogate although
such consent could not have been acknowledged in N.Z.); INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGE-
MENTS, supra note 9, at 514.
71. But see Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 16 (stating that
if the rule is well-publicized and strongly enforced, it may achieve high enough levels of
deterrence that the number of children who end up being “surrogacy exiles” is close to zero).
72. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 22 (1989) (describing a
similar, vertical thesis).
73. Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 LAVERNE L. REV. 323, 336
(2010).
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The global-pluralism advantage of this model, however, is also its
weakness. A mechanism that incorporates pluralistic national legislation
might be ethically insufficient and unsatisfying if it fails to rise above a
certain level of commitment to protecting suppliers of reproductive ser-
vices, and leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding rules of conduct and
medical standards.74 In consumers’ countries whose national conduct is
poor, although consistent transactions might answer the demand for con-
sistency, they will keep resulting in structural injustice and exploitation.
On a normative level, this model saws off the branch on which the univer-
sal norms of human rights rest, because it diverges from the demand for a
universal minimal threshold. In the absence of some acceptable frame-
work or minimal standards in this model, it is supported only by domestic
political theories. Many of the standard arguments for civil and political
rights rely on universalism and hence necessarily hold that some rights
have a universal scope. A global justification of justice between the state
and other states or with regard to foreigners should be embedded in some
international aspects, rather than stem only from domestic political rela-
tions between a state and an individual.75
Moreover, the consistency model does not provide any argumentation
as to why non-liberal states should be obliged to pursue liberal “just” for-
eign policies.76 This model is based on global tolerance toward all policies
and could imply a requirement of tolerance even toward non-liberal values
and policies.77 Governments of liberal states should act tolerantly in their
dealings abroad in the same way their citizens expect them to act domesti-
cally. Yet, in the absence of a common ideological ground, there is no
normative argument for requiring non-liberal states to adopt this model.
Pressure to take part in these transactions might be sufficient to push them
to do so voluntarily, but it may be futile in ameliorating the protections for
women in at least some of the cross-border reproductive transactions be-
tween liberal and non-liberal states, such as between consumers from the
West and women from China.
The legal tools I have presented as being viable options for a state to
pursue domestically—extraterritorial criminalization and conditional leg-
islation— are either merely symbolic or violate the rights of children. It is
74. Pennings, supra note 2, at 338-39 (arguing that a permissive universal rule accord-
ing to which all states allow their citizens to receive services in other states might result in
regulation according to the level of the most permissive country). See also MARTHA C. NUSS-
BAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 42 (2011) [herein-
after NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES] (acknowledging that the threshold might be easy
to meet but less than what human dignity requires).
75. BRILMAYER, supra note 72, at 29.
76. Garcia, supra note 73, at 337. See also Barry, supra note 17, at 233 (arguing that
little can be achieved if no one feels morally compelled to struggle for reform of unjust rules).
77. But see Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113,
135 (2005) (discussing whether or not liberal states are obliged to tolerate non-liberal states
or to try to transform them. Nagel argues that liberal states are not obliged either to tolerate
non-liberal states or to try to transform them, because the duties of justice are essentially
duties to our fellow citizens).
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important to note that even if these tools can ensure a consistent national-
international policy, they cannot necessarily guarantee a proper way of
conduct, and are thus an inefficient solution to the problem of structural
injustice resulting from global reproductive markets. In light of all these
reservations, unilateral tools alone are not suitable for regulating cross-
border reproductive transactions. In the following Section, I will argue
that joint actions between actors could lead to more desirable transactions.
Globalization forces us to elevate the level of analysis beyond the state
and reevaluate the responsible bodies on an international scale. Effective
measures to deal with the unjust effects of cross-border reproductive
transactions would require the application of several approaches, national
and transnational, on behalf of all stakeholders: consumers, women suppli-
ers, governments and professional international institutions. Finally, I will
suggest a shared responsibility model for cross-border reproductive
transactions.
II. THE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
The late Iris Marion Young of the University of Chicago Political Sci-
ence faculty worked on remedying structural injustice by reconceptualiz-
ing assessments of causation and responsibility. She noted that the
common model of guilt or fault is usually unfit to deal with structural in-
justice, since it demands the assessment of intentions, motives, and conse-
quences of actions.78 In most cases of structural injustice, it is impossible
to determine which specific actions of which specific actor caused each
specific aspect of the structural process or its outcome.79 For example, we
could condemn destination countries for channeling their healthcare budg-
ets to target foreign consumers’ demands instead of providing essential
primary healthcare for their own citizens. Although medical centers are
often built with private money and not at governmental expense, public
policies that seek to encourage the supply of services to foreign patients
draw away professional staff who could have been part of the public
healthcare system.80 However, it is unclear whether the foundations of re-
productive markets come at the expense of public resources that would
otherwise fund the public healthcare system. Supporters of medical tour-
ism argue that revenues generated from treating international patients can
be used to cross-subsidize publicly funded healthcare.81 Such policies
could serve as a means to reduce emigration of healthcare providers to
78. Young, supra note 12, at 118.
79. Id. at 115.
80. See Annette B. Ramirez de Arellano, Patients without Borders: The Emergence of
Medical Tourism, 37 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 193, 196-97 (2007) for an example in the case of
Thailand and India; See also Leigh Turner, ‘First World Health Care at Third World Prices’:
Globalization, Bioethics and Medical Tourism, 2 BIOSOCIETIES 303, 320 (2007) (discussing
the “possible harms to inhabitants of destination Countries”).
81. See Turner, supra note 80, at 315 for an example: Singapore. The cross-subsidize
argument mentioned here is probably less relevant to reproductive services such as egg dona-
tion and surrogacy and more relevant to medical healthcare. Reproductive services are usu-
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wealthier nations, and prevent the exportation of skilled healthcare work-
ers out of the country.82 In light of these arguments, it seems that back-
ground injustice may cause unjust effects that, although predictable,
cannot be blamed on one specific actor.83 The need to trace a direct rela-
tionship between the action of an identifiable entity and harm might let
certain powerful parties involved in causing the injustice, albeit indirectly,
off the hook. Young claimed that although we cannot blame all contribu-
tors, it is inappropriate to dismiss them.84 In view of the difficulties of
pinpointing a single body or entity accountable for the injustices that oc-
cur, this model does not fit all cases of structural social injustice.
Structural injustice does not merely exist, but is a consequence of the
actions that states and other parties take. It is the result (or a side effect)
of the actions of many people and of many legitimate (or at least accept-
able) practices, rather than the result of an individual’s action (as would be
required in the typical blame model).85 For example, consumers’ states
have a right to choose a reproductive policy allowing cross-border transac-
tions, while the destination states have right to allow or forbid such trans-
actions in their territory. It is the combination of national regulation in
consumers’ countries, insufficient protection in destination countries, and
the decisions of individuals in the context of globalization as well as the
neo-liberal international regime that results in injustice and negative
implications.
Christian Barry, an Australian political philosopher, echoes Young in
offering a somewhat similar model of shared responsibility for justice.
Based on both of their parameters (some unique and others overlapping),
I offer a slightly refined shared responsibility model. I suspect that market
failure and externalization of negative implications are partly the result of
the absence of a procedure that enables cooperation between bearers of
responsibility. Joint action is necessary.86 The solution should be mul-
tileveled and structural—a result of connection and cooperative action—
as no single participant can stop injustice on her own. My model takes into
consideration the responsibility of different kinds of actors, from different
states, different background conditions and social positions, in a special
context of interaction as a basis for the commitment to justice. In this sec-
ally provided through private clinics, and this money does not enter the health system but
rather reaches private hands.
82. Id. at 314.
83. Young, supra note 12, at 120. See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EX-
PANDED EDITION 266 (2013) (mentioning background injustice that occurs even though no-
body acts unfairly or is aware of how the overall result of many separate exchanges affects
the opportunities of others. Economic agents are not required to follow rules that can pre-
vent these undesirable consequences, since they are often so far in the future, or so indirect,
that restricting them would be an excessive burden).
84. Young, supra note 12, at 118.
85. Id. at 116.
86. See Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender Jus-
tice, 24 BIOETHICS 323, 332 (2010) (arguing for concentrated cooperative action).
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tion, I will present my model starting with the parameters of the shared
responsibility model. I will then apply these parameters to the case of
cross-border transactions.
1. Engaging Actors – Who Bears a Duty?
The engaging parameters locate the involved actors, and explain why
they are assigned responsibilities (who are the contributors to injustice?).
According to the engaging parameters, in the case of harms resulting from
structural injustice, all actors directly and indirectly interconnected
through in this structure should bear some responsibility for the injustice.
Either because their actions contribute to the unjust structure or because
of the benefit they gain from it.
a. Accountability and Benefit
The accountability parameter allocates responsibility according to the
extent to which actors have contributed to bringing about the unjust situa-
tion, according to the causal connection of their actions (similar to
Young’s and Barry’s principle of contribution).87 Accountability is the
common ground between the shared responsibility model and the classic
blame model, a parameter that links the responsibilities of actors to the
unjust structure. The difference is that the blame model looks at unaccept-
able behavior to inflict punishment or to exact compensation for past mis-
behavior, or potentially seek prevention of similar future events.88 In
contrast, the purpose of the accountability principle is always not to blame
but rather to correct and prevent ongoing structural injustice. Hence,
under this model, actors are not responsible in the sense of mal-intention,
but in the sense that they have a duty to work within their capacity to
remedy these injustices.89
The benefit parameter is based on the unjust gain each contributor
gets from the illicit situation (privilege or beneficiary principle).90 It re-
lates to the amount of responsibility an actor should have: the higher the
benefit, the greater the responsibility. Direct gain will result in greater re-
sponsibility, but even indirect gain indicates the actor has some level of
87. Barry, supra note 17, at 228; Young, supra note 12, at 119 (arguing that individuals
bear responsibility when one’s actions within a scheme of social cooperation contribute to
injustice).
88. Young, supra note 12, at 120.
89. See id. at 114. (“All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing
schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are responsible for them, in the sense
that they are part of the process which causes them. They are not responsible, however, in the
sense of having directed the process or intended its outcomes.”).
90. Barry, supra note 17, at 229 (Beneficiary – the one who has benefited more from
the injustice is assigned greater responsibility; Young, supra note 12, at 128 (arguing that
whoever benefits more from structural injustice should be considered more liable).
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responsibility.91 The actors that benefit more are usually those who have
the capacity to change the structure in their favor.
Accountability and benefit parameters redirect attention from the
consequence to the contributors, from those who experience justice and
injustice, to those who produce them.92 The pragmatic advantage of the
engaging parameters is significant. While the blame model must prove ex-
ploitation in order to find the responsible bodies, the focus on accountable
actors makes it possible to minimize vague evaluations (and disagreement)
regarding the actual effect of suppliers’ vulnerability on their autonomous
decision (in order to determine exploitation), or what should be fair to
citizens of one country in comparison to another.
This Article next examines who the engaged actors in cross-border
reproductive transactions are and what level of responsibility each contrib-
utor bears.
2. Who the Engaged Contributors are in Cross-border
Reproductive Transactions
In order to implement accountabilities according to the shared respon-
sibility model, actors should be those authorized to act in any of the areas
that interface with cross-border reproductive markets and offer an im-
provement. If those authorized to act have the potential to remedy some
of the injustice, then the duties to meet ethical standards should apply to
international institutions (including professional organizations and
NGOs), states (both consumers’ and destination states), and individuals
from different states (consumers and suppliers of the transactions, physi-
cians, clinics, and mediators). All have responsibilities when engaging in
cross-border reproductive transactions.93
Institutions are engaged because they structure and are structured by
common activities in the global sphere.94 The interactions within any
cross-border market, and specifically those in the reproductive services,
are mediated by institutions so that individuals can enjoy market relation-
ships.95 Institutional rules and roles enable members to do things together
without necessarily sharing personal relationships. Institutions create the
value necessary to pursue common goals, grant recognition between fellow
actors, and provide the necessary social coordination needed to sustain
91. Yossi Dahan et al., Global Justice, Labor Standards and Responsibility, 12 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 439, 463 (2011).
92. Compare “model of active justice” with “the consequentialist model,” Thomas W.
Pogge, Responsibilities for Poverty – Related Ill Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS, 71, 75,
77 (2002) [hereinafter Pogge, Responsibilities for Poverty].
93. For stakeholders that benefit from the structure, see Donchin, supra note 86, at
330; Points, supra note 6, at 3, (“Infertility clinics, healthcare providers, medical tourism com-
panies, the broader tourism industry, the Indian government, and the women who provide
surrogacy services all profit from this industry.”).
94. See Jonathan Seglow, Associative Duties and Global Justice, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 54,
57 (2010) (for the inclusion of institutions on a social relationship-based ground).
95. JONATHAN SEGLOW, DEFENDING ASSOCIATIVE DUTIES 42-3 (2013).
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social relationships. Conditions for the healthcare industry’s growth are
supported by the neo-liberal agreements negotiated in international trade
organizations; health organizations which control medical hazards and
human rights institutions that ensure that health rights and women’s rights
are not violated. Since the hegemonic existence of the market provides the
setting for cross-border reproductive transactions, international institu-
tions that facilitate the protection of human rights, trade, travel, and
health standards, the accreditation of foreign hospitals, and the training
and credentialing of foreign doctors should all be included.96 As such, in-
stitutions are expected to weigh the impact their policies have on others
according to the nature and context of their involvement. I believe that a
desirable policy requires cooperation between international institutions
that specialize in these matters, and among these institutions and states.
The focus on international institutions is not separate from the ac-
countability of states, which are globally and nationally entangled in global
governance. Shared responsibility analysis exposes more connections be-
tween national and international economic systems. Each country has
some responsibility towards their citizens. Consumer countries have re-
sponsibility over actions within their direct authority in terms of the regu-
lation of family related policies, and these domestic policies are
complimentary to the responsibilities that destination countries have to
suppliers. States are also accountable for the domestic implementation of
international law and for the negative consequence that national policies
have beyond their borders. Some of the responsibilities of consumers’
countries are indirect: for example, for their part in designing the interna-
tional order and regulating cross-border trade. Thus states should be held
responsible for changing these structures when they are unjust. Other du-
ties are residual and occur only because destination countries do not com-
ply with their own duties towards their poor (such as duties to provide
basic needs).
The assumption is that those who benefit from unjust structures are
accountable. Destination states gain revenue and consumers’ states gain
access to reproductive services. Both fall within the benefit parameter,
thus should be held responsible accordingly. In view of states’ gains and
interests in cross-border reproductive transactions, destination and con-
sumers’ states should not be exempt from their responsibilities. As actors,
both have duties towards their citizens and toward fellow actors who are
each other’s citizens. They should therefore share the responsibility for the
unjust structure that cross-border reproductive transactions create.
Consumers bear direct responsibility for purchasing choices that sus-
tain exploitation. Since the transaction is supposed to benefit its parties,
some sorts of duty exists between them, regardless of nationality. Addi-
tional individual responsibility stems from familial relationships. The in-
96. Though several evaluative bodies are used to assess institutional quality, the Joint
Commission International is now the dominant global player in the international hospital
accreditation business. For international accreditation, see Turner, supra note 80, at 311; Co-
hen, Medical Tourism and Global Justice, supra note 49, at 36.
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volvement of foreign women in the process of reproduction has
implications for the resulting children’s right to know their biological par-
ents or for future medical possibilities that might be connected to the egg
donor or surrogate. The model assigns certain duties between consumers
and suppliers for their share in the industry, that is, the specific transac-
tions in which they are involved. Individuals hold the additional indirect
responsibility for the reproductive policies created by the politicians they
elect. Yet, individual contribution to the world order creates normatively
weaker duties, and individual effort to address unjust structures might be
futile.97
Finally, physicians, private clinics and mediators contribute to the
cross-border reproductive milieu through their professional and economic
roles. All earn their fees from such transactions and have a lot to gain
from engaging in this system.98 These actors should be liable for their pro-
fessional and business roles in the industry and for their general contribu-
tion to the structure.
The added value of the shared responsibility model is, first, that the
scope and type of actors involved is wider. The shared responsibility
model allows us to examine how all these parties are entangled in cross-
border processes and accounts for actors that the blame model might have
neglected. Second, the shared responsibility model is not limited to direct
causal connections and thus avoids allowing those indirectly involved shirk
responsibility. This inclusion is helpful even when the unjust situation
stems from an unfortunate combination of legal actions that inadvertently
results in injustice; where the number of actors responsible for a certain
situation has increased to the point that it is doubtful whether a single
actor, even a state or an international institution, could remedy the injus-
tice by itself; or where multiple contributors are assigned only a small
amount of responsibility and no one effectively bears the responsibility to
correct the injustice.99 These parameters are therefore more realistic re-
garding how actors are involved in the global legal, social, and economic
networks. Each actor is personally responsible for the outcome of its ac-
tions, at least partially, and therefore bears an independent responsibility
to remedy injustice. Accordingly, engaging one actor according to this pa-
97. Compare Pogge, Responsibilities for Poverty, supra note 92, at 74 (assigning re-
sponsibilities to citizens of the developed countries for supporting politicians that are willing
to shape global institutions to support their interests, rather than help foreign victims of the
current institutions), with David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 11 CRITI-
CAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 383, 385 (2008) (claiming that such a responsibility is a
matter of degree according to the ability of citizens to control the direction in which their
society is moving and the viable external conditions that a state faces in important areas of
decisions such as economic and social policy. When the public sphere is privatized, it is
doubtful whether states truly represent all populations in the national sphere, hence citizens
are held responsible). But see id. at 387-88 (2008) (“ultimately, individual responsibility
should be symmetric. If we assign such responsibility to consumers, people in poor states
should be held responsible for their situation and their votes.”).
98. Donchin, supra note 86, at 330.
99. Barry, supra note 17, at 222; Dahan, supra note 91, at 449.
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rameter does not dismiss other duties that stem from other relations, and
the responsibility of one actor is not reduced if another fails to fulfill its
own responsibility. Having clarified how each actor is engaged, I will next
elaborate on the sort of responsibilities each actor should have.
3. Assigning Duties
After recognizing the actors engaged, assigning parameters relate to
the sort and the amount of responsibility that each actor bears, and to the
site where they are expected to take action. Since each actor is differently
positioned in the structure (the practice of cross-border reproductive mar-
kets) each has different responsibilities in nature and scope. For example,
institutions have different responsibilities than individuals, and strong ac-
tors have wider responsibilities than those with weaker capacities.
a. Capacity – How to Assign Duties
Both Young and Barry note the importance of an actor’s capacity to
make a change (the capacity or power principle). The capacity principle
requires each actor to be accountable only for the sort of things that are
within their ability to change.100 Young claimed that contributors should
focus on injustices where they have a greater capacity to influence the un-
derlying structural processes.101 The scope of the expected action is in ac-
cordance with the position of power of each actor. Those institutionally
and materially situated to be able to do more to affect the conditions of
vulnerability, such as states and institutions, have greater duties than less
powerful individuals or groups.102 This is a very effective and practical
condition, because it transfers many responsibilities from individuals to
stronger actors, taking into consideration different levels of power.
Although I agree that change may be difficult to achieve without the
involvement of strong actors, such as states, I have two reservations about
this capacity principle. First, analyzing cross-border reproductive issues in
terms of capacity will always lead us to the same strong actors (govern-
ments, international institutions, or powerful corporations) as these actors
hold the greatest power. The capacity mechanism must be sensitive
enough to ensure that in spite of the many duties assigned to these strong
actors, weaker actors’ responsibilities are not dismissed. Second, Young
assumed that the more interest one has in the results of a process, the
more power one often has to change it.103 This point was justly criticized
by Dahan et al., arguing that the greatest interest often belongs to the
victims, who do not necessarily have the greatest power to remedy the
structure and should not be assigned greater responsibility.104 The vested
100. For capacity to alleviate unjust conditions, see Barry, supra note 17, at 230-31. On
power, see Young, supra note 12, at 127.
101. Young, supra note 12, at 127.
102. Id. at 106.
103. Id. at 128.
104. Dahan, supra note 91, at 457.
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interest of actors may, however, prioritize the projects within their capac-
ity.105 With each actor having many different duties, they actor should
probably focus on those in which he has the greater interest (and capacity)
to decrease injustice. For example, consumers’ states would have greater
interest to harmonize nationality issues of the resulting children, while
women’s organizations should strongly push towards the protection of
women.
b. Connectedness - What Kind of Duty?
Barry mentions the condition of connectedness – the allocation of duty
on the basis of special relationships.106 I read this parameter as articulat-
ing the different kinds of duties each actor is expected to bear due to the
special roles that connect each actor to another, rather than how each ac-
tor is connected to the injustice (the connection to injustice is a prelimi-
nary engagement criterion rather than a parameter for assigning
responsibilities). The connectedness parameter makes it possible to assign
different duties in different relationship circumstances. Each duty is in ac-
cordance with the specific level of commitment to justice, and the different
values that actors have.107 When one actor is less involved, his duties are
less stringent as a result. The possibility of scaled degrees of connected-
ness, and therefore scaled degrees of cooperation, allows room for flexible
normative principles that are more effective and that can improve
compliance.
This parameter makes it possible to assign responsibilities according
to infrequently acknowledged relationships, namely those between nation-
states and international institutions and those between individuals and the
international institutions regulating the trade regime. Transnational, state,
institutional, and private responsibilities all go hand in hand.108 When the
focus is on the meaning of the relationship between actors, an additional
aspect of recognition and consideration of other actors is promoted. Some
duties may relate to rights or care, for example, rather than to purely legal,
economic, or contractual fairness issues.
Moreover, this parameter enables us to change the bearer of a specific
duty according to the context of each case. For example, it can be argued
that the Third World is not limited to places that are beyond the borders of
Western states. Migrants and the poor in developed countries perform
similar labors, which are similarly devalued by consumers. The difference
105. See Young, supra note 12, at 129 (suggesting prioritization according to the ease of
recruiting support and collective actions, which could also be seen as a form of power).
106. Barry, supra note 17, at 229.
107. See David Miller, Reasonable Partiality towards Compatriots, 8 ETHICAL THEORY
& MORAL PRAC. 63, 72 (2005) (arguing that the final weight of a duty would be the product
of two factors: the content of the duty, and the closeness of our attachment to the people to
whom the duty is owed).
108. See Bhupinder S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International
Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (2004); Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibil-
ity for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 295 (1999).
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between national and international regulation would be the bearer of re-
sponsibility. In a domestic surrogacy transaction, the entire responsibility
for the framework of markets lies with the state and its institutions (both
to provide basic capabilities and to ensure just conditions for transacting
due to the state commitment towards people who are within its territory).
In cross-border markets, some of the same responsibilities might be shared
with international institutions or with other actor states.
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NEED FOR JOINT ACTION -
 RECOMMENDATIONS
The shared responsibility model does not assume one proper way of
behavior, but supports multiple alternative interpretations. In light of the
evidence of growing demand, it is doubtful that banning reproductive ser-
vice markets would be practically possible. Thus, this model aims at chang-
ing the balance of the market. Rather than leave suppliers with the choice
between living in poverty and entering into a transaction in which they are
unrecognized and become vulnerable to exploitation, the model leaves the
choice in the hands of consumers: either to use reproductive services while
granting the suppliers recognition for their contribution, or to not use the
services.109 Pursuant to the demand that all actors involved receive protec-
tion, suppliers be recognized, and their position in the market empowered,
legitimate transactions are likely to become more expensive.110 I would
hazard a guess that if suppliers were to gain a certain level of recognition
and a fair distribution of benefits, “desirable transactions” would not be as
profitable for consumers and demand would decrease.
Reforms advanced at one level may modify or subvert goals at an-
other level, and thus might work at cross-purposes.111 Potential pitfalls to
this model are that it would likely increase the industry instead of restrict-
ing it. Enhancing reproductive protections would encourage more transac-
tions to take place. It will probably enhance the legitimacy of these market
transactions especially for those who see the harms of the industry in the
way transactions are being carried out rather than in something inherent
to the process of surrogacy. Nevertheless, I believe that the entire frame-
work I suggest is sufficiently moderate to balance the increased demand
due to legitimacy given to desirable transactions.
109. Cf. WALZER, supra note 14, at 61 (regarding guest workers; “Democratic citizens,
then, have a choice: if they want to bring in new workers, they must be prepared to enlarge
their own membership; if they are unwilling to accept new members, they must find ways
within the limits of the domestic labor market to get socially necessary work done. And those
are their only choices.”).
110. Cf. id. at 176 (arguing that higher payment is a direct consequence of hiring (recog-
nized) fellow citizens for hard work, previously done by others and sold at lower cost).
111. Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms
and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199, 212 (2005).
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1. Legal Parenthood and the Nationality of the Child
Legal parenthood and the nationality of the children resulting from
cross-border surrogacy transactions are probably the most difficult issues
to coordinate. On the one hand, nationality concerns are country-specific
decisions that do not rely on a universal rule. On the other hand, these
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decisions are directly connected to the human right to plan a family and to
children’s rights, such as the right to nationality (i.e., to be recognized as a
citizen of some country), the right to be registered after birth, and other
universal norms.112
One possibility is that a child could have several registered relation-
ships: the genetic, the gestational, and the intended. States would have a
duty to register them, and this registration could support states’ duties ac-
cording to human rights norms. Registering the supplier as the biological/
genetic mother should grant the child at least one nationality according to
most nationality policies, and perhaps, indirectly, may also support chil-
dren’s rights: it will reduce cases of statelessness, ensure the right of the
children to obtain information about their origin, and be fruitful in cases
where medical knowledge of a genetic background is needed to treat the
resulting child.
Registration will not solve the problem without parallel recognition by
other states. Recognition of parenthood and registration of nationality
both require some comity among various foreign institutions and an un-
derstanding between states, similar to the understanding regarding inter-
national adoption.113 Comity expresses legal reciprocity and the extension
of certain courtesies to other nations, particularly by recognizing the valid-
ity and effect of a jurisdiction’s executive, legislative, and judicial acts.114
The shared responsibility model could therefore assign duties to states to
engage in these efforts to address recognition of cross-border reproductive
transactions. There are two alternative legal tools that could be helpful
here: an international convention or multilateral agreements. A conven-
tion would provide a framework of international cooperation and could
establish procedural rules that would facilitate the process.115 Such a con-
vention would outline procedural rules for acknowledging public records
regarding legal parenthood by assigning responsibilities to states and au-
thorities, and ensuring that the rights of children are upheld. A convention
could be efficient once a common understanding is reached. In the mean-
while, taking into consideration the current disharmonious international
reality, multilateral agreements are a more likely option. They make it
possible to articulate regulation based on a specific understanding be-
tween specific countries, and thus have greater potential to gain legiti-
macy. This tool would enable consumers’ states to uphold their own
112. Sharon Bassan, Can Human Rights Protect Surrogate Women in The Cross-Border
Market? HAGUE ACADEMY LAW BOOKS (forthcoming, 2015).
113. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Convention on
the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 32 I.L.M.
1134, 1136 (1993) [hereinafter Hague Convention on the Protection of Children].
114. On comity, see Storrow, supra note 26, at 543.
115. See generally, INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 533-540. Cf.
Hanna Baker, A Possible Future Instrument in International Surrogacy Arrangements: Are
There ‘Lessons’ to be Learnt from the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention, in
INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 411, 420-21 (describing the convention
regarding international adoption as both an administrative tool as part of private interna-
tional law and a human rights instrument).
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policies, and minimize problems that would require ad hoc solutions, such
as recognizing children that are the result of cross-border transactions,
which would be unacceptable according to domestic policies.
Some efforts are currently being made on a diplomatic level. In 2010,
the General Consuls of eight European states wrote a joint letter to a
number of clinics in India requesting that they cease providing surrogacy
options to their citizens unless consumers first consulted with their em-
bassy on these matters.116 The United Kingdom also issued new guidance
for prospective parents looking at cross-border reproductive care, urging
them to ensure beforehand that they are fully aware of the facts and are
well prepared.117 The Israeli embassy in Bangkok sent a query to the Thai
Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the hiring of Thai female nationals
to act as surrogate mothers by Israeli nationals in order to make sure that
the procedure was acceptable, and to verify that the child would not re-
main stateless.118 In a parallel effort, the Indian bill conditioned the eligi-
bility to purchase services on proof from consumers that the resulting child
would be permitted entry, that they could register the child as their child,
and that the children would be granted citizenship in the consumers’
state.119 Finally, in order to create a better balance between the interests
of the concerned actors, as well as a higher ethical standard, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is currently investigat-
ing the prospects of the adoption of international instruments on cross-
border surrogacy transactions.120
2. Proper Medical Standards
In cross-border markets, it is unclear what are the ethical and profes-
sional standards. According to some reports, reproductive services are
supplied in high-level facilities in developing countries and pose fewer
risks to public health than other treatments provided as part of medical
116. For France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Czech Republic, see
IVF Centres Direct Foreigners to Consulates over Surrogacy Issue, HINDUSTAN TIMES, (July
15, 2010), www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Mumbai/IVF-centres-direct-foreigners-to-
consulates-over-surrogacy-issue/Article1-572534.aspx.
117. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, Surrogacy Overseas, (June 19, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324487/
Surrogacy_overseas__updated_June_14_.pdf.
118. Letter no. 1403/2756 from Thai. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, to the Em-
bassy of Isr., Bangkok (Dec. 12, 2013) (on file with the author) (clarifying that the law grants
Thai citizenship to any child born to a Thai mother. Additionally, the letter states that Thai-
land does not yet have specific regulation on this issue, but an act that had recently been
drafted explicitly prohibited commercial surrogacy. Therefore at that time the Thai position
neither supported nor encouraged the phenomenon, and considered it in contravention of
the Thai Anti Human Trafficking Act BE 2551 (2008)).
119. The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010, cl. 34.19 (India),
http://icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULATION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf.
120. See The “Parentage/Surrogacy Project” – About the Project, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIV. INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=181 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2015).
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tourism.121 Nevertheless, the oversight of health, safety, or professional
credentials in clinics that supply reproductive services to foreigners may be
limited to national and regional registries, and even where the practice is
regulated it can be under-enforced. The safeguards to protect the health of
suppliers vary.122 At least in a few destination countries, where accredita-
tion is voluntary, there is no control over fertility clinics that choose not to
be associated with the registries.123 The result is that non-accredited clinics
have total discretion over how to run their clinics and which services to
offer, and they are free from official oversight.
Supplying reproductive services in the absence of proper medical care,
supervision, or follow-up endangers suppliers and the resulting children,
and violates their rights to health. This situation is undesirable for both
parties to the transactions, as well as for their countries. Medical complica-
tions can burden the healthcare systems in both consumers’ and destina-
tion countries. First, a supplier might suffer complications and burden
healthcare systems in destination countries where the complications occur.
Second, the children born from the procedure might receive unsatisfactory
care, or bring diseases into the consumers’ country once they go to their
new homes. Consumer countries might have to internalize the medical
harms caused by an insufficient standard of medical care in destination
countries.124 Which associates are connected to this harm? Which have the
121. See Robert K. Crone, Flat Medicine? Exploring Trends in the Globalization of
Health Care, 83 ACAD. MED. 117, 120 (2008) (regarding general medical tourism) (reporting
that patients are treated by highly skilled doctors, sometimes with better technical novelty
than is available elsewhere); George Palattiyil et al., Globalization and Cross-Border Repro-
ductive Services: Ethical Implications of Surrogacy in India for Social Work, 53 INT’L SOC.
WORK 686, 687 (2010) (arguing that the services delivered are comparable with similar ser-
vices provided in the developed countries, but prices are much cheaper. Some hospitals and
universities are globally recognized ‘brands,’ and partner with clinics in destination countries,
where they fly both patients and doctors from the country of origin, to enjoy cheap services
of the same quality).
122. Bassan, supra note 112.
123. See Andrea Whittaker, Challenges of Medical Travel to Global Regulation: A Case
Study of Reproductive Travel in Asia, 10 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 396, 400 (2010). E.g., Florencia
Luna, Assisted Reproductive Technology in Latin America: Some Ethical and Socio-cultural
Issues, in CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONTROVERSIES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: REPORT
OF A MEETING ON “MEDICAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION”
HELD AT WHO HEADQUARTERS 31, 38 (E. Vayena, P. Rowe & G. David, eds., 2001), http://
www.who.int/reproductive-health/infertility/7.pdf; Pennings, supra note 2, at 337 (in Belgium,
for instance, the policies concerning assisted reproduction differ considerably between secu-
lar hospitals and Catholic hospitals). For registration uncertainty in India, compare CENTER
FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 23; Lal, supra note 8 (reporting 600 IVF clinics in
both rural and urban areas in almost all states of India) with Sheela Saravanan, An
Ethnomethodological Approach to Examine Exploitation in the Context of Capacity, Trust
and Experience of Commercial Surrogacy in India, 8 PHIL. ETHICS & HUMAN. MED. 1, 1
(2013) (reporting about 3000 registered clinics across India offering surrogacy services, ac-
cording to official figures).
124. Regarding the self-interest of developed countries in the regulation of the medical
services market, see Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 13; Cohen,
Medical Tourism and Global Justice, supra note 49, at 16. See, e.g., Franc¸oise Merlet, Regula-
tory Framework in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Relevance and Main Issues, 47 FOLIA
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capacity to act? While both states and individuals are engaged, solutions
require health regulation and monitoring and thus fall within the capacity
of states, rather than of individuals. In addition to being ethically required,
clear professional guidelines could benefit all cross-border reproductive
associates potentially harmed by this diverse array of regulations, stan-
dards and procedures.
As long as services such as egg recruitment or surrogacy are provided,
destination states need to ensure that the practice does not endanger the
health of suppliers and is provided according to professional and ethical
guidelines. No treatment, whether through reproductive services transac-
tions or otherwise, should violate the suppliers’ health rights.125 These rec-
ommendations are hardly innovative and should have been incorporated
in cross-border reproductive transactions. A proper medical standard
should ensure minimal conditions for safe procedures and could be univer-
sal, since good medical practice for pregnant women does not depend on
cultural or national values, but rather on evidence-based medicine. Al-
though standards are not typically backed by sanctions, international insti-
tutions, such as the WHO or other professional organizations, could set
helpful professional standards of medical care.126
An ethical concern may arise if the standards applied to naturally
pregnant women who deliver their own children in destination countries
are lower than the standards for those who are carrying a pregnancy for
foreign women. Generally, the access to sexual and reproductive health-
care services in destination countries should improve for all women.127
HISTOCHEMICA ET CYTOBIOLOGICA S9, S12 (2009) (relating to different levels of safety that
jeopardizes both consumers’ countries and suppliers); Turner, supra note 80, at 318 (arguing
that it is possible that advertising as well as information provided by the clinic minimizes the
risks and exaggerates the benefits in order to encourage consumers to pursue treatment. The
advertisemenet is thus unreliable).
125. For human rights as the minimal threshold, see THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2nd ed., 2008). On the content and substance of the right to health,
see Aeyal Gross, The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization - National
and International Perspectives, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS 289, 295 (Daphne Barak-Erez
& Aeyal Gross eds., 2007).
126. How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 19.
127. The role of the state is to act in order to provide equal, nondiscriminatory access to
the benefits of health services to all individuals, see Economic and Social Council, ICESCR
General Comment No. 14 (The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health), UN DOC.
E/C.12/2000/4, art. 12 (Aug. 11, 2000) (stating that the state should adopt a public health
strategy, addressing the health concerns of the entire population, including those whose pov-
erty, disabilities, or background make them the most vulnerable; provide measures to elimi-
nate barriers that women face in gaining access to healthcare services, including affordable
prices (art 12(1)(21)); ensure information and education and enforce the obligation to re-
spect, protect and fulfill women’s rights to healthcare both in public and private systems (art
12(1)(13-14)). States are also obligated to respect the negative aspects (freedoms) of the right
to health, to refrain from directly or indirectly interfering with the enjoyment of a right by
denying or limiting access, by blocking equal treatment for all people, or by enforcing dis-
criminatory practices or prohibiting third parties to deprive its people of the guaranteed
right.). See also Audrey R. Chapman, Globalization, Human Rights, and the Social Determi-
nants of Health, 23 BIOETHICS 97, 102 (2009).
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From the perspective of the right to health, states are obligated to provide
measures to minimize barriers interfering with women’s access to health-
care services, such as prohibitively high prices for provided services, lack
of reproductive education and information, and a lack of respect for
women’s rights to healthcare both in public and private systems.128 Desti-
nation states should try to enforce proper standards in clinics that provide
reproductive services and empower suppliers to make informed decisions
by providing these women with critical information about the procedure,
so as to improve women’s understanding of the impact their decisions
have on their bodies and health.129 It means that in order to ensure mini-
mal professional standards in cross-border reproductive transactions, the
position of all women, especially poor women, needs to improve. The
state’s ability to fulfill its duty to provide this information to all pregnant
women in their country is impacted by the amount of resources it can
devote to women’s health in general.130
International law can help solve this problem. The obligations of
states to promote human rights are relative to their levels of development
and available resources.131 Besides “core obligations” associated with the
right to health,132 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights includes an article that imposes a duty on lower-middle-
income countries to take steps to the fullest potential of their available
resources, with a view towards progressively achieving the full realization
of rights recognized in the Covenant.133 This may imply that in poor and
lower-middle-income countries with limited ability to protect health rights,
the duty to ensure the standard of care should be lower than in affluent
countries.134 When resources are limited, poor countries may not be able
128. Elimination of Discrimination against Women Council, Gen. Recommendation No.
24, U.N. DOC A/54/38/REV.1, at 5-9 (May 4, 1999).
129. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 86 at 326-327 (calling for a greater duty to explain
the risks than that of women who are undergoing treatment to circumvent their own infertil-
ity, because these women are being treated for another’s benefit, and the treating clinic has a
powerful incentive to maximize benefits to those who pay their fees. For example, she men-
tions a duty to tell egg donors in advance that they might have difficulty conceiving in the
future or might give birth to a child who develops a disability).
130. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 4, at 346 (regarding the costs of the measures required
to ensure that a woman provides her fully-informed and free consent).
131. Chapman, supra note 127, at 102.
132. For the core obligations as identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, see Economic and Social Council, ICESCR General Comment No. 3 (The
Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Fifth session, 1990)), U.N. DOC. E/1991/23 (1991), re-
printed in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. DOC. HRI/GEN/1/REV.6, art. 10 (2003). See also Health,
in A. CLAPHAM & S. MARKS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 197, 202 (2005);
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 259 (2014).
133. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (1966); S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2 (1978); S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967).
134. See Lisa Forman, What Future for the Minimum Core? Contextualizing the Impli-
cations of South African Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence for the International Human
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to fully comply with their human rights duties. However impoverished,
destination states should not be exempt from their core duties if they fail
to allocate resources responsibly, or to adopt needed legislative mea-
sures.135 In cases where the country has extremely poor health services,
determining whether or not the state has fulfilled its duties requires con-
sidering the overall allocation of resources to healthcare as compared to
other sectors, rather than relying solely on examining national resource
allocation within the healthcare system.136
Accordingly, a shared responsibility model requires a foundation for
more extensive international assistance and cooperation. The fact that des-
tination countries should alleviate the harms caused by cross-border re-
productive care but fail to do so ought not to prevent consumers’ countries
and international institutions from fulfilling their commitments. The Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights implies that
the residual responsibilities of states, particularly those with greater finan-
cial and technical resources, are to assist and cooperate beyond their bor-
ders.137 It emphasizes the importance of international financial aid and
technical assistance for achieving the goals of the Covenant. Consumers’
state duties may include tax-financed official development aid, paid by
clinics or doctors that mediate cross-border reproductive transaction ser-
vices, to ensure that suppliers have medical insurance, according to just
principles.138 This would not release destination countries from the duty to
Right to Health, in GLOBAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 63, 63 (John Harrington, Maria Stuttaford, eds., 2009).
135. See Amartya Sen, Why health equity?, 11 HEALTH ECON. 659, 661 (2002).
136. For accountability for reasonableness regarding resource allocation in developing
countries, see NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY, chap. 10
(2008).
137. Chapman, supra note 127, at 103 (arguing that article 2 of the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasizes the importance of international
financial aid and technical assistance for implementing the rights in the Covenant. It also
implies the human rights responsibilities of states, particularly those with greater financial
and technical resources, beyond their borders.); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin &
Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 645 (1991)
(calling for expansion of state responsibility to incorporate responsibility for systemic injus-
tice based on international conventions).
138. For a tax from rich countries regarding medicines, see generally NUSSBAUM, CRE-
ATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 74, at 117 (2011); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUS-
TICE 316 (2006) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE] (arguing that rich nations
ought to give a minimum of 2 percent of GDP to poorer nations. A mechanism should be
developed to transfer this money to suppliers in other countries or to advance their inter-
ests.); Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 17; Thomas Pogge, Access
to Medicines, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 73, 76-78 (2008). See, e.g., About, UNITAIDS, http://
www.unitaid.eu/en/who/about-unitaid (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (29 countries have volunta-
rily chosen to impose on airlines departing from their countries a tax on departing passenger
tickets collected by the airlines set by the country in order to fund UNITAIDS, a NGO
aimed at scaling up access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, primarily
for people in low-income countries. Similar funding could be directed to medical insurance of
suppliers, or women’s health funds in destination countries). The problem remains with
transactions that are constructed online through international brokers.
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promote relevant public goals and allocate resources among their own
citizens.
While the required medical standards for performing egg recruitment
or IVF procedures in a surrogate apply to all procedures across the globe
and should be universal, when it comes to contract terms, a more flexible
approach may be appropriate. Contracts can require more flexible regula-
tion and may be open to negotiation between actors, with the understand-
ing that there is some room for contextual interpretation. The next part
will suggest possible tools for ensuring that parties reach mutually desira-
ble terms in their contract.
3. The Terms of the Contract
The shared responsibility model might be able to minimize concerns
regarding exploitative conditions and help reduce the negative impacts of
cross-border reproductive transactions. Known information regarding the
current exploitative practice of surrogacy transactions indicates aspects
that contracts should address, including informed consent, the price, living
standards of surrogates during pregnancy, basic freedoms (right to move-
ment, right to control their bodies), family visiting rights, medical insur-
ance, screening processes of potential suppliers, medical-ethical
considerations such as a neutral personal doctor for suppliers, translators
for the surrogate, the supplier’s right to complain or press charges, the
surrogate’s assimilation back in her community after birth, and more.139
This Article’s proposal regarding legal regulation of contracts is based on
two concepts: the demands of basic human rights and fair trade.
a. Human Rights Protection
Aside from a few specific clauses, most contract terms should and
could be universal, as they regard basic rights that should not be vio-
lated.140 Using human rights as a starting point offers substantive and
practical benefits.141 The rights framework is based on a common ground
for cooperation and clarifies an acceptable universal benchmark, while al-
lowing for contextual national interpretation. Human rights provide a
mechanism to confront violation of rights and an enforcement system that
could be effective. The human rights mechanism enables international
monitoring, possibly with the help of international institutions as part of a
global strategy, while also addressing individual claims, as contracts are
between individuals rather than states.
At the international level, a political mechanism should allow profes-
sional and human rights organizations to resist powerful political and eco-
139. I will elaborate on the content of desirable contracts in the Israeli example, infra
sec. III.4.
140. For human rights implications of cross-border surrogacy transactions, see Bassan,
supra note 112; Ergas, supra note 66, at 428.
141. On the use of international human rights as a legal instrument, see Chimni, supra
note 108, at 14-15; Ergas, supra note 66, at 429.
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nomic interests that may compromise human rights in order to promote
neo-liberal considerations.142 There are some international legal tools re-
lated to health and trade that could be of use. The WHO’s International
Health Regulations encourage states to implement health measures, in ac-
cordance with their relevant national laws and obligations under interna-
tional law, in response to specific public health risks or public health
emergencies of international concern.143 As there is ample evidence of un-
safe practices in the reproductive sphere, international regulation would
be helpful, restricting trade in reproductive services and basing these rules
on international standards. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol could serve as a model legal framework, given that it is responsive to
the similar concern that liberalizing trade might encourage consump-
tion.144 Using a framework convention similar to the one on Tobacco con-
trol should not prevent states from entering into compatible multilateral
agreements, but rather encourage governments to adopt measures beyond
those required by the Convention.
b. Safeguards for Negotiable Elements
While medical standards and human rights issues cannot be compro-
mised, other issues within the contract are negotiable and could be left to
the choice of the parties within a framework that safeguards minimal
thresholds. Contracts should leave room for negotiation according to indi-
vidual, national, or cultural values, as long as they express responsibility
towards all actors including consumers, suppliers and the resulting chil-
dren. In regards to surrogacy, living arrangements could be such a topic. It
is in the interest of the clinic that surrogates live in better pregnancy-re-
lated conditions, and do not have sexual intercourse with their husbands
(which might expose them to diseases). The clinics would also receive ad-
ditional payment for the surrogate’s food and accommodation from the
intended parents.145 This solution is not necessarily detrimental to the sur-
rogate either. It may be compatible with the surrogate’s interest of mini-
mizing negative stigma in their communities, and they might willingly
agree to such terms.146 Such an arrangement expresses recognition of sup-
pliers’ needs and respect for their position. Price is another negotiable
142. See, e.g., Kelley Lee et al., Bridging the Divide: Global Governance of Trade and
Health, 373 LANCET 416, 420 (2009) (suggesting that budget funds in the WHO should be
forthcoming to strengthen the organization’s capacity to engage more actively in trade and
health issues).
143. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, art. 43, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
[WHO] (2005), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf?ua=1.
144. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, June 16, 2003, 2302
U.N.T.S.166. See GOSTIN, supra note 132, at 296.
145. CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 52.
146. Saravanan, supra note 123, at 8 (reporting that some surrogates were happy to stay
in the surrogate home and escape daily household chores or domestic problems);
SAMA–RESOURCE GROUP FOR WOMEN AND HEALTH, BIRTHING A MARKET: A STUDY ON
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY 39, 123 (2012), http://www.samawomenshealth.org/downloads/
Birthing%20A%20Market.pdf.
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term, though there should be a minimum acceptable threshold. These ex-
amples show that the pursuit of personal or national interests is legitimate,
but regulated standards similar to fair trade standards of conduct should
and could be drafted with regard to the negotiable elements in the transac-
tion. Similar bilateral agreements have begun to do so regarding migrants’
rights in response to pressure from advocates and from countries of ori-
gin.147 Analogous pressure could provoke a similar move regarding cross-
border reproductive contracts for eggs and surrogacy services.148
States should join forces and agree on a minimum threshold of medi-
cal, ethical and safety conditions safeguarding the parties’ basic rights and
provide a framework of negotiation in order to minimize the possibility of
exploitation. State intervention represents society’s position regarding fair
terms and its commitment to allowing transactions to take place only if the
results of the transactions are fair.149 It need not be paternalistic, nor di-
minish actors’ autonomy.150 Rather, it is justified by the asymmetry in bar-
gaining positions that exists if intervention does not take place.151 It is
questionable whether destination states will actually be willing to engage
in international agreements that deprive them of the power they have over
“their” women’s reproductive capacities. Yet, I believe that in light of the
declining control that lower-middle-income countries suffer from in the
free market, many destination states will have an interest in collaborating
in order to protect the fundamental rights of their women and reclaim
their former power over national reproductive capacities. By recognizing
that suppliers of reproductive services are the most economically and emo-
tionally vulnerable party to the transaction, states should ensure that the
parties’ participation in the market is conducted under fair conditions, as is
the case with other protective legislation, such as labor legislation, and
legislation on behalf of minors and other disadvantaged parties.152
147. Jennifer Gordon, People are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade,
104 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L REV. 1109, 1127 (2010) (explaining that some agreements in-
form migrants of their rights, while others include enforcement mechanisms for those rights).
148. See also Donchin, supra note 86, at 330 (reporting that lately some destination
countries that had offered access to foreigners for medical care are considering regulation to
reduce access, e.g., Poland and other Eastern European destination countries).
149. WALZER, supra note 14, at 60.
150. See Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 139, 141 (1990) (arguing that as long as the state is requested to acknowledge,
let alone enforce, surrogacy contracts, one cannot argue that regulating the practice is
paternalistic).
151. See Dahan, supra note 91, at 453.
152. Heather Widdows, Border Disputes Across Bodies: Exploitation in Trafficking for
Prostitution and Egg Sale for Stem Cell Research, 2 INT’L J. FEMINIST APPROACHES TO
BIOETHICS 5, 9 (2009) (discussing the analogy of labor law as justified for state intervention,
due to recognition that workers are vulnerable and prone to exploitation. Labor relations are
protected by legal restrictions and limitations on working conditions, and involve judicial
intervention in settling industrial disputes).
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A possible tool could be borrowed from the model of fair trade.153
The fair trade model aims at achieving better trading conditions for pro-
ducers of products exported from developing countries, especially the pay-
ment of higher prices and higher standards. Coffee bean pickers,
surrogates, and egg sellers all operate behind the scenes. The fact that sur-
rogates and egg sellers provide a service rather than sell a product should
be irrelevant for the sake of the proposed model. Just as coffee bean pick-
ers should be safeguarded in their work, surrogates should be safeguarded
while providing their service. Moreover, if we find it important to protect
those who pick our coffee beans, this protection seems all the more neces-
sary when it comes to those who provide the genetic material that con-
ceives future generations, or those who carry the babies to term. Under
fair trade principles, there are some sectors in which governments super-
vise and control the legitimacy of quality criteria for imported products.
Take for example the 1993 French establishment of an obligatory govern-
ment-supervised organic certification scheme.154 Quality, in this sense, re-
fers not only to safety that safeguards consumers, but also to cultural and
ethical qualities, sensitive to both the social and environmental needs of
individuals and populations in places of manufacture.155 Conceptualizing a
fair standard model based on the fair trade idea and practice could there-
fore help ensure ethical standards beyond those inherent in medical safety.
Solidarity-based multilateral agreements and voluntary work by pro-
fessional organizations have proven successful regarding health worker
migrations. One possible model to examine in voluntarily coordinating
multinational concerns is the WHO’s Global Code of Practice on the In-
ternational Recruitment of Health Personnel, which was drawn up in or-
der to promote voluntary principles and practices for the ethical
international recruitment of health personnel.156 The code specifically
states what constitute responsible recruitment practices, including what to
do when recruiting from countries facing a critical shortage of health per-
sonnel. It determines, for example, that recruitment should be limited by
needs in that person’ own health system (art. 4.2). However, once migrant
health personnel are recruited, both foreign and domestically trained
health workers have equal rights and responsibilities (art. 4.5). A repro-
ductive related code could condemn certain conduct within the industry on
153. For a suggestion of principles of fair trade in surrogacy services, see, e.g., Casey
Humbyrd, Fair Trade International Surrogacy, 9 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 111, 116-18 (2009).
See also Nir Eyal, Global Health Impact Labels, in GLOBAL JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS 241, sec. 3
(Ezekiel Emanuel & Joseph Millum eds., 2012), http://peh.harvard.edu/events/2013/
global_health_footprint/PDF/Eyal_GHILs.pdf (suggesting the creation of a global labeling or
accreditation standard that audits facilities and informs medical tourists of how attentive a
facility is to healthcare access concerns regarding the local population).
154. Marie-Christine Renard, Quality Certification, Regulation and Power in Fair
Trade, 21 J. RURAL STUD. 419, 423 (2005).
155. Id. at 421; Lee, supra note 142, at 420.
156. WHO, WHO GLOB. CODE OF PRACTICE ON THE INT’L RECRUITMENT OF HEALTH
PERSONNEL, May 21, 2010, http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/WHO_global_code_of
_practice_EN.pdf.
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the one hand, but also support an information exchange system and estab-
lish a network of national authorities to encourage other conduct on the
other.157
Contextualization requires interaction between society and political
institutions. States have a particular stake in the subject—whether it is a
consumer’s state, a surrogate state, an egg-donor state, or a combination
thereof. States should be actively involved in designing international
norms and should be allowed to voice concerns and reservations through-
out the process. There should be an option of using input from states in
the international political structure through activities such as public work-
shops and public debates. It has been suggested, for example, that in order
to shape and manage trade policies that affect health, the WHO should
work with ministries of labor, education, finance, foreign affairs, trade and
commerce to provide training on the health-related implications of trade
agreements, and improve everybody’s knowledge and capacity to operate
within their states.158
According to the shared responsibility model, individuals must also
follow through and fulfill their duties. Since reproductive services consti-
tute a private industry, negotiable terms are the major area where individ-
uals have the authority as well as the capacity to act. Regarding negotiable
terms, specific individuals’ duties may be relatively narrow and include
mainly the duty to design the terms of their specific transaction, and to
ensure a fair distribution of benefits. As private consumers, individuals
have a power to influence the market and not include unjust contractual
clauses in contracts they are parties to. They can use their economic mus-
cle to demand fair contractual terms and raise awareness of injustice, when
necessary. Even strong actors have an incentive to take part in a just prac-
tice, and most would consciously choose not to exploit others if they had
enough awareness: parents want to be able to tell the resulting children
about the process with pride. Nevertheless, creating a beneficial structure
would mean changing the status quo.159
Young believed that external pressure could be sufficient to drive
powerful actors (such as consumers) into action to change unjust situa-
tions.160  Young used the sweatshop example (consumers would not like to
buy something produced in a sweatshop, thus manufacturers are pressured
to act justly), and many other fair-trade activists also deploy this argu-
157. Id. art. 7.
158. WHO, EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS, STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE
HEALTH OUTCOMES – WHO’S FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 10, 17, 23, 32 (2007), http://
www.who.int/healthsystems/strategy/everybodys_business.pdf. On the importance of improv-
ing coherence across different sectors through, for example, interministerial committees, see
Lee et al., supra note 142, at 421.
159. A.J. Julius, Nagel’s Atlas, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 176, 192 (2006) (recognizing that
the richest people in the world might oppose his theory since they have too much to lose).
160. Young, supra note 12, at 127. See also Renard, supra note 154, at 423 (arguing that
consumers will be willing to pay more for ethical manufacturing if they are guaranteed that
the price premium will actually reach producers).
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ment. There are reasons to be skeptical of Young’s assumption that benefi-
ciaries of an unjust process would voluntarily adapt to changed
circumstances, at least in the case of infertility. People may not buy coffee
picked under exploitative terms and settle for the second-best choice of
coffee, but not being able to have children without surrogacy is a heavier
burden. Moreover, if reproductive transactions were subject to fair trade
principles, the price would increase for these types of transactions, leaving
surrogacy an unaffordable option for many. Nevertheless, this is a pessi-
mistic view, at least in the sense of consumers’ willingness to participate in
ethical transactions. For example, there is an Israeli initiative called “Re-
sponsible Surrogacy” (2014) that is meant to expose potential consumers
of cross-border surrogacy to information about the ethical aspects of the
procedure, with the hope that it will drive consumers to demand agree-
ments that incorporate these considerations.161 The motivation for this
project stems from an understanding that the moral responsibility lies with
the intended parents, and that their stand may lead to changes in the pro-
cedure in favor of all involved. This initiative is a good example of how
individual duties might be incorporated into a beneficial cross-border re-
productive model.
c. Monitoring
A framework for fair transactions raises a need for international regu-
lation of individuals’ relations within the global market. Some trade-re-
lated cooperation would have to take place. Under the current
international order it is unclear which institutions should be assigned the
authority to monitor cross-border transactions and suggest adaptations.
Since cross-border reproductive transactions involve medical procedures,
economic transactions, and women’s bodily services, collaboration be-
tween women’s organizations (such as UN Women), the WTO or the
World Bank, and the WHO seems likely possibilities. These organizations
could offer necessary points of connection between trade and health in
general, as well as reproductive services in particular.162 Regulating
health-related trade probably exceeds the current mandate of the WHO,
which is the prevention of disease migration.163 The roles of the World
Bank and WTO also do not necessarily cover all these rights.164 Neverthe-
161. See generally PUNDEKAUT ACHRAIT [RESPONSIBLE SURROGACY], http://www.r-
surrogacy.org/ (last visited July 20, 2014). A website that discusses many areas in which ethi-
cal problems may taint the contract making it undesirable for the surrogate in order to raise
the consciousness of, as well as market pressure on, potential consumers.
162. See, e.g., THE CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS ON TRADE AND HEALTH, http://
www.cpath.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (publishing a list on globalization and health, and
posting brief descriptions and contact information for additional key organizations attempt-
ing to address the public health effects of global trade).
163. Cohen, Medical Tourism and Global Justice, supra note 49, at 50-51.
164. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement,
WORLD BANK, art. IV, sec. 10 (Feb. 16, 1989), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER
NAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049603~menuPK:63000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:
36600~theSitePK:29708~isCURL:Y,00.html (stating that political affairs fall outside the
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less, these institutions are concerned with capacity building within coun-
tries, and this foundation can be used as a common framework for
collaboration.165 The functions of WHO and UN Women fit more natu-
rally with the issues that lie at the heart of cross-border reproductive mar-
kets. Both are committed to monitoring wider systematic progress, and
their goals and functions may justify intervention in regulating and moni-
toring cross-border reproductive transactions.166 Moreover, extensive in-
tervention by these two organizations, rather than the WTO or the World
Bank, may prevent further commercialization of surrogacy and better ex-
press the relationships and contextual needs behind markets in women’s
bodily services.
Monitoring the market effectively requires international as well as na-
tional cooperation. If we want all actors to equitably enjoy the opportuni-
ties that the market has to offer, coordination between international
institutions and national bodies is needed. International institutions, for
example, have important roles to play in supporting governmental actions:
UN Women must support intergovernmental bodies in their formulation
of policies, global standards and norms, help member states implement
these standards, and stand ready to provide suitable technical and finan-
cial support to those countries that request it. UN Women could also ad-
vise states on how to forge effective partnerships with civil society.167 The
WHO similarly could help states in strengthening health services by aiding
in the establishment and maintenance of effective collaboration with the
United Nations, specialized agencies, governmental health administra-
realm of factors that the World Bank and its officers are authorized to consider). See Chap-
man, supra note 127, at 107-08 (arguing that there is no basis in international law for arguing
that human rights promotion is within the mandate of the World Bank and the WTO).
165. See Procedural Decisions of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Decisions adopted by the Committee at its eighteenth session, U.N. DOC. E/1999/22,
para. 515(7) (1998) (“Effective social monitoring should be an integral part of the enhanced
financial surveillance and monitoring policies accompanying loans and credits for adjustment
purposes. Similarly the World Trade Organization (WTO) should devise appropriate meth-
ods to facilitate more systematic consideration of the impact upon human rights of particular
trade and investment policies.”). See also Building Trade Capacities, WTO, http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm (last seen Nov. 16, 2013); Trade
and Health, WHO, http://www.who.int/trade/resource/tradewp/en/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2013); Advancing Gender Equality: Promising Practices, UN WOMEN, http://
www.unwomen.org/mdgf/overview.html (last seen July 20, 2014).
166. WHO, The Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 2(i)(k)(q)(r) (July
22, 1946), http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf?ua=1 [hereinafter
Constitution of the World Health Organization] (duty with regard to international and public
health-related issues, for example: to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and
make recommendations with respect to international health matters, and specifically, to pro-
mote maternal and child health and welfare; to provide information, counsel and assistance
in the field of health; to assist in developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on
matters of health.); About Unwomen, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/
about-un-women (last visited July 20, 2014) [hereinafter About Unwomen, UNWOMEN] (“to
hold the UN system accountable for its own commitments on gender equality, including reg-
ular monitoring of system-wide progress.”).
167. About Unwomen, UN WOMEN, supra note 166.
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tions, professional groups and other organizations.168 The WHO can use
its capacity to collect data from member states as part of its country analy-
sis to provide consistent, comparable information about cross-border re-
productive transactions and their effect on women suppliers’ health. This
data could help to measure whether each actor maximizes the likelihood
that his duties will be successful.169
Ensuring fair terms for reproductive services could be aided by inter-
national institutions, but cannot be achieved without parallel enforcement
by states. The burden of ensuring that cross-border transactions do not
exploit suppliers’ poverty should lie on consumers, but the obligation to
demand and monitor fair terms in these transactions is an obligation of the
state.170 Consumers’ states could revise contracts to make sure that they
comply with standard safeguards, as done domestically, for example, in
Australia (VIC, WA and, by practice rather than legislation, ACT),
Greece, Israel, and South Africa, which mandate that contracts be vetted
for ethical approval.171 Today some countries review contracts retrospec-
tively, as part of the process of granting legal parenthood or nationality
(for example, Brazil, Mexico, and Holland).172 However, a procedure that
revises the contracts ex ante could better ensure just terms than proce-
dures that only begin after a child is already involved. Otherwise, the state
will find itself confronted with children resulting from undesirable surro-
gacy procedures but unable to do anything to minimize the damage.
Regulating a framework for reproductive services based on fair terms
would probably be more attractive to consumers’ states that accept some
sort of commercialization of reproductive services, even with restrictions.
Politically, it may be hard for countries that completely ban the supply of
reproductive services to regulate a market that they consider intrinsically
unethical or wrong.173 However, due to the fact that even states that com-
pletely condemn surrogacy acknowledge the resulting children due to the
implications that such trade has for children’s rights, these duties should
not be voluntary. As long as its citizens are involved in cross-border repro-
ductive markets, whether states like it or not, they become actors in the
process and should bear a duty to promote ethical transactions. Therefore,
every state, no matter what national policy it holds, should be accountable
for ensuring fair cross-border reproductive transactions.174
168. Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 166, at arts. 2(b)(c).
169. On the collection of information (e.g., statistics and standards), see, e.g., Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children, supra note 114, art. 7.
170. For the Spanish case, see Storrow, supra note 26, at 544.
171. PERMANENT BUREAU, supra note 53, at n. 63.
172. Mexico, in INT’L SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 10, at 271; Holland, at
287.
173. Tobin, supra note 4, at 344.
174. Humbyrd, supra note 153, at 116 (arguing that a framework for ethical surrogacy
arrangement should be mandatory rather than optional).
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4. The Israeli Example
Israel was the first country to legislate surrogacy and one of the first
countries to urge the international community to develop a multilateral
response to the disharmonized regulation between different jurisdic-
tions.175 A draft bill submitted in 2014 in Israel would amend the law in a
noteworthy attempt to confront the difficulties stemming from cross-bor-
der surrogacy transactions.176 Many principles mentioned in this paper are
reflected and implemented in this proposal. Article one reflects the need
for consistency, as it applies the law to any surrogacy arrangement for Is-
raeli citizens, carried out in Israel or elsewhere. Articles two and seven
specify minimal medical standards (limitations on the number of transac-
tions each surrogate can take part in and on the number of implantation
cycles that can be carried out). Article six recommends separation of the
medical staff between the intended mother and the surrogate. It is meant
to ensure that the surrogate’s best interests are the sole consideration for
her medical staff and that the professional staff does not suffer from a
conflict of interest.
The bill does not ban cross-border transactions from taking place
(maybe acknowledging that the state will not be able to enforce any ban),
but it reflects the principle of proportionality, by equalizing the eligibility
of all citizens for domestic surrogacy on the one hand, and enlarging the
national pool of potential surrogates to include married women as poten-
tial surrogates in addition to single women on the other. As a conse-
quence, cross-border transactions will probably not be abolished, but it
will hopefully reduce the number of cross-border transactions in favor of a
safer domestic procedure, subject to Israeli monitoring and standard
setting.
Nevertheless, the bill misses some key regulations of domestic surro-
gacy that should be taken into consideration. In an ethical contract, the
surrogate should be recognized and her agency respected in the decision-
making regarding her body. Currently the rights of the surrogate to choose
her physician, to make decisions about her body, or to terminate the preg-
nancy, are not specifically stated. An embryo, or a fetus, albeit not made
from the gametes of the supplier, is nonetheless connected to her body, to
which she has the only right. This balance should be kept even within a
surrogacy transaction. Suppliers should be free to change their mind about
bearing a child and still be paid for their effort until that point, without
being considered liable for breaking the contract.177 The bill also did not
note the possibility of a future relationship between the surrogate and the
resulting child. Neither surrogate nor child had an enumerated right to get
175. Baker, supra note 115, at 412.
176. Draft Bill Amending the Law of Agreements to Carry Embryos (No. 2), 2014, HH
916 (Isr.).
177. Humbyrd, supra note 153, at 117 (recommending that payment must be indepen-
dent of pregnancy outcome, such as miscarriage, voluntary abortion, stillbirth or disabled
child).
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information about the other (similar to some adoption arrangements). Ad-
ditionally, the draft bill limited the amounts that surrogates could charge,
while letting physicians, clinics, and mediators to negotiate payments with-
out constraint.  Only the opportunity of the surrogate, the weakest actor,
is limited. If the rationale behind this bill is not to expose women to ex-
ploitation, it would be better to remove the financial incentives of
mediators, and to set a minimal threshold on the payment made to surro-
gates, above which they could attempt to further negotiate.178 Another
problem is that the draft bill does not appoint any national monitoring
body to ensure that the procedure is conducted properly, whether gener-
ally or in regards to mediators.
A specific subsection in the draft bill relates to cross-border transac-
tions and expresses a certain commitment to critical aspects of justice.
First, articles 17H-I discusses few mandatory terms of the contract, includ-
ing demanding that the surrogate sign the contract before the first treat-
ment, that information regarding the meaning and consequences of the
treatment be given to her and that she freely consent to the procedure.
The contract should protect the rights of the foreign surrogate regarding
her ability to terminate her pregnancy. Additionally, the contract should
not contradict the law in the destination country (including legal eligibility
of foreigners for domestic surrogacy services and the demand that domes-
tic laws in destination states acknowledge the child as the consumer’s
child). The surrogate should get a copy of the contract. Consumers should
be obligated to take the resulting child regardless of circumstances and not
be able to reject it (due to abnormalities or disabilities, for example). The
draft bill also states that statistical information regarding the number of
applications and actual procedures carried out should be transparent and
available to the public. Although Israel may not be able to ensure the
extraction and enforceability of all these demands, there is moral value in
its attempt to revise them: the bill reflects a serious intent to confront the
challenges posed by cross-border transactions.
Several important issues are insufficiently addressed in the bill or
missing completely. The draft bill avoids mentioning preliminary medical
criteria for choosing foreigner surrogates, as it does for Israeli surrogates
and does not address possible responses to illegal procedures other than
criminalization of all involved. It leaves many questions unanswered, for
example: which authority should be responsible for the child if the in-
tended parents are penalized and put in jail? Another issue to consider is
that administratively, in order to ensure the child could get certain infor-
mation regarding the surrogate according to his/her right, a registry of all
actors (suppliers, consumers and mediators) should be kept. I also suggest
178. It is hard to determine what is considered a fair price. A minimum price might
reduce exploitive conditions towards the supplier by giving them better payment for their
work. However, it might raise objections on the part of infertile patients incapable of paying
higher amounts. These people would not be able to recourse to the market to fulfill their
right to reproduce. A possible suggestion may be to set a minimum price, or to determine
that suppliers get no less than 50% of the value of the transaction.
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that the foreign surrogate be informed of her right to file a mistreatment
complaint at the Israeli embassy.
This section has presented a case study that demonstrates what a just
structure for cross-border reproductive transactions might look like. Nev-
ertheless, the bill still reflects the existing power imbalance, as it fails to
abolish the commercial incentives of mediators who profit from impover-
ished women providing their wombs. To rectify this, the draft bill proposes
that mediators and agencies involved in cross-border reproductive transac-
tions be accredited. Although accreditation is quite common, it is not the
best way to address the role of mediators. Former experience shows that
the licensing of certain mediators assigns great power to private entities
and may involve corruption or give commercial benefits to the few, chosen
agencies. There is no justification for further commercialization of the pro-
cedure by promoting the financial interests of mediators. The 1993 Hague
Convention on Adoption may be a useful model to consider for dealing
with mediators. The most significant improvement the Hague Convention
on Adoption suggested regarding international adoption was to adminis-
tratively control mediators and replace for-profit entities with non-profit
ones.179 Mediation of reproductive transactions should be carried out by
state institutions or by non-profit NGOs, similar to those who regulate and
oversee adoption in Israel.180 Ethical guidelines and monitoring mecha-
nisms for such organizations should be clearly drafted.
The draft bill demonstrates that Israel is aware of its responsibility
towards its citizens and towards foreigners who might be affected by this
reproductive policy. It tries to ensure that cross-border transactions will be
monitored, inasmuch as a unilateral action can ensure monitoring, as well
as ensure equal rights of foreign and domestic surrogates when transacting
with Israeli consumers.
However, the reality is that the ability of the proposed bill to abolish
exploitative transactions is dubious. The enforceability of the criminal of-
fenses will not necessarily reduce exploitative transactions, for example, in
the case of mediators or physicians who are not Israeli. Also, it is hard for
a state to exercise extraterritorial authority over its citizens when they pri-
vately engage in transactions that are legal where they are carried out.181
In the absence of justification for using the legal tool of extraterritorial
offenses only domestically related elements could be criminalized. On the
assumption that the basic conditions of supply and demand remain un-
179. On safeguarding against abuse by intermediaries in the Hague convention, see
Baker, supra note 115, at 422-25.
180. Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March
2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing,
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells, Directive 2004/
23/EC (urging Member States to take steps to encourage a strong public and non-profit sec-
tor involvement in the provision of tissue and cell application services and the related re-
search and development). But see Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46,
at 15 (suggesting that the reviewing bodies should be third parties and not the government
itself).
181. See supra, sec. I.1.
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changed, even if this bill was passed, bargaining power between the parties
would stay about the same, and future contracts would reflect that imbal-
ance, to some extent. The next section notes that any truly comprehensive
regulation must address the wider aspect of background inequality and
focus on the unequal opportunities and poverty that incentivize women to
enter into reproductive services transactions in the first place.
5. Wider Requirements
The current unjust system is the result of various social, political, and
legal circumstances in destination countries. There is a correlation be-
tween poverty, social vulnerability, and the absorption of contractual and
health risks. In a country like India, for example, which lacks social safety
nets, and where the governance structure is attuned only to the needs of
the rich and powerful sectors of the society, poor unskilled women’s sala-
ries hardly covers basic needs, such as housing, medical treatment, and
education of their children.182 This means that these women need to pur-
sue private options to get them. Lack of social support (such as welfare) in
destination states creates poverty and economic vulnerabilities such that
the poor are afraid to refuse or renegotiate transactions, even though the-
oretically these contracts are open to negotiation.183
Fair distribution of the benefits from a reproductive transaction would
not necessarily be sufficient to take people out of the poverty cycle, and
could not compensate for the lack of education, health insurance or hous-
ing that cause women to enter surrogacy transactions in the first place.184
It would not change the ambitions and aspirations of the poor to earn
money any way they can in order to receive equal recognition. As long as
these conditions endure, poor people will remain oriented towards trans-
actions that do not truly improve their conditions. Since the main mo-
tivator of this type of market is that impoverished individuals have
insufficient alternatives on how to earn money, it is clear that fighting pov-
erty should be part of the solution of bringing negotiation parity to
contracts.
The fight for a reduction in economic disparities is a wider problem,
not specifically related to cross-border reproductive transactions. It is one
of the main concerns of the global justice literature, and clearly a wider
issue than the issues this paper can address. While contract rules and safe
medical care may be dealt with through regulation, the problem of poverty
is unlikely to be cured by regulation alone. I do not pretend that a regula-
182. CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 32.
183. Onora O’Neill, Justice, Gender and International Boundaries, 20 BRITISH J. POL.
SCI. 439, 457 (1990).
184. Id. at 456 (arguing that by idealizing capacities and independence of parties in-
volved in market transactions, liberalism overlooks power asymmetry and obscures why the
weak may be unable to dissent to arrangements proposed by the strong); How to Regulate
Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 30 (arguing that we should think not only about remedial
measures, but also about how the injustice of the global order might be diminished through
institutional reforms).
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tive model of cross-border reproductive transactions can indirectly achieve
this goal. However, it could, and should, be considered when applying the
shared responsibility model on any practice that is so closely correlated
with poverty. Miller mentions two preliminary conditions that states must
ensure:185 first, all participants of the market system must enter it with
some degree of freedom. Second, states should accept terms of trade only
when it benefits their citizens.
Citizens should be able to participate as market agents free from the
influence of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, or morbidity.186 These types of vul-
nerabilities are partially socially constructed. Comprehensive human de-
velopment involves the economic, educational, social, cultural, and
political development of the individual, family, and community in order to
empower those populations.187 Social exclusion and inequality cannot be
rectified unless society changes its norms and expectations towards the
poor. National political structures therefore must be assigned a duty to
improve the social/political/economic conditions necessary in order to pro-
mote self-actualization of their citizens.188 This argument assigns responsi-
bility to the governments of destination countries to improve capabilities,
and holds them accountable for poverty.189
Suppliers should not enter reproductive transactions out of economic
deprivation or despair. Autonomy requires a set of possible options for
poor women to choose from, without compromising their own health and
wellbeing. They should have different alternatives to earn money in case
they do not want to offer reproductive services. States should provide
safety nets of substantive needs to its poor, invest resources, enact laws,
and develop infrastructure, institutions, and policies for this purpose.190 If
people must earn money, states should strive toward changing the social
division of labor in order to change the bias of the structure itself. Society
should consider “the right to a basic income” as a social good that should
be equally available to all. The least a state should do is secure basic rights
and conditions of livelihood of citizens who cannot earn an income in
traditional labor markets. If the state provided safety nets, suppliers could
be free to decide not to enter exploitative transactions. In these circum-
185. Miller, supra note 97, at 396-97.
186. See SATZ, supra note 13, at 27; Naomi Pfeffer, Eggs-Ploiting Women: A Critical
Feminist Analysis of the Different Principles in Transplant and Fertility Tourism, 23 REPROD.
BIOMED. ONLINE 634, 639 (2011).
187. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 74, at 21.
188. Id. at 113 (arguing that each nation should provide support of the central capabili-
ties of all citizens).
189. For an overview of the capabilities approach, see generally supra note 74; 4–11
(2001); 39–53 (1992); 231-35 (2009). For differences between Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions,
see supra note 74, at 19-20. For capabilities across national boundaries, see supra note 138, at
273–315.
190. WALZER, supra note 14, at 180. Cf. id. at 56-57 (claiming regarding guest workers
that in a constrained labor market (where unions and the welfare state protect the worker)
the wages and working conditions of the undesirable jobs might improve radically, which
might raise the costs of transaction and challenge the existing social hierarchy).
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stances any choice could be respected, including the choice to transact
their reproductive capacity, as long as the terms are fair. State accountabil-
ity grows when it provides health services to foreign consumers in a way
that might come at the expense of its own citizens’ access to health care
(especially if these citizens normally do not have access to these services).
The failure to assign this responsibility lets states ignore the importance of
background conditions in cases of exploitation and contributes to the so-
cial acceptance of transactions based on such inequality, both in poor and
in affluent countries. It might also normalize more subtle exploitations of
those who are economically vulnerable.
Consumers’ countries might be more remotely connected to structural
inequality and the implementation of international norms in suppliers’
countries, which are extant regardless of cross-border reproductive trans-
actions. They might have no direct connection to the surrogates’ state’s
poverty, gender, or class inequality. Class inequality itself, after all, exists
independently of participation in cross-border reproductive transactions.
Inequalities that we see today derive from external factors such as status
hierarchies, organizational structures and power relationships. This truth
enables consumers’ states to renounce responsibility in regards to foreign
suppliers of reproductive services and point a finger instead at govern-
ments in destination countries, where the transactions occur and where the
suppliers offer their services. Yet affluent countries bear responsibility as
well.191 Their citizens depend on and benefit by transactions that stem
from these inequalities, making them indirectly connected actors.192
Consumer states must therefore play their part in creating interna-
tional institutional infrastructure. Today, any negotiation to determine de-
191. For excessive poverty as the responsibility of the politically and economically influ-
ential states, see, e.g., NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 74, at 42; NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE supra note 138, at 316; Thomas W. Pogge, Moral Universalism and
Global Economic Justice, 1 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 29, 44 (2002). For the basis of such a duty,
see Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 308 (basing the duties on trusteeship for promoting the
rights of all human beings and their interest in sustainable utilization of global resources);
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE supra note 138, at 115 (basing responsibility on past
colonialism); Thomas W. Pogge, Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources
Dividend, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 59, 73 (2001) (basing duty on the interests of affluent states to
efficiently avoid externalities of poverty in advance rather than in retrospect. Pogge argues
that cross-border externalities and risks will become a two-way street because no state will be
able to effectively insulate itself. Poverty will cause military and terrorist attacks, illegal im-
migration, epidemics and the drug trade, pollution and climate change. I don’t see these
externalities as relevant in the specific case of cross-border reproductive transactions.); In-
terim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right of
Everyone to Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, To the
United Nations General Assembly, UN DOC. A/58/427, para. 32. (Oct. 10, 2003) (by Paul
Hunt), para. 32 (basing the responsibility to work actively toward equitable multilateral trad-
ing, investment, and financial systems conducive to the reduction and elimination of poverty
on article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
192. The fact that the destination country can alleviate the harms caused by cross-bor-
der reproductive care but fails to do so ought not to prevent consumers’ countries and inter-
national institutions from fulfilling their global justice commitment. Supra II.1.a, the
accountability principle.
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sirable international trade norms is, in itself, subject to inequalities and
power imbalances among states. Critics challenge the norms adopted by
international institutions as serving the dominant groups in society, and
denying equal economic benefits to others.193 Consumers’ countries
through international institutions should redesign the global sphere in a
way that enables all actors to enjoy cross-border transactions fairly under
safe standards. Actors should either develop new procedural tools (institu-
tions and rules) or strengthen existing ones in order to conceptualize cul-
tural recognition and social equality through empowerment, solidarity and
support, regardless of low status or political powerlessness.194
A state’s international responsibilities for shaping global social ar-
rangements should be commensurate with its position in decision-making
procedures and intergovernmental bargaining. This proportional concep-
tion of responsibility imposes a greater burden on affluent countries.
These states are in a stronger position to influence the international order
and are dominant decision-makers in international institutions. Consum-
ers’ states should therefore bear greater responsibility for improving pro-
cedural international rules. A shared responsibility model thus answers
the demands for justifying external duties incumbent upon richer states
and other institutions.195
The development of mechanisms for institutional international consid-
erations exceeds the scope of this paper, but in general, improving repre-
sentation should express recognition of individual members within society
are full partners in political agency. Global trade regulations should be
sensitive to social needs, even at the expense of economic values.196 For
example, I recommend procedural and substantive engagement of con-
cerned individuals as part of a more contextualized rulemaking process.
Alternative mechanisms for the representation of all actors in interna-
tional decision-making, not exclusively through the sovereignty of the
state but through, for example, NGO’s,197 could improve the interaction
193. Lee, supra note 142, at 417 (arguing that the priorities of countries with the great-
est resources remain dominant).
194. WALZER, supra note 14, at 118 (stating this requirement in order to reach complex
equality).
195. It can be attributed to the TWAIL perspective. See Opeoluwa Adetoro Badaru,
Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for International
Human Rights Law, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 379, 383 (2008) (“the utility in TWAIL
analysis is its ability to show how the activities in one part of the world can have detrimental
effects in other parts of the world (the Third World especially), and hence, could equip schol-
ars with justifications for extraterritorial obligations from richer states.”).
196. See Ronald Labonte, Globalization, Health, and the Free Trade Regime: Assessing
the links, 3 GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT & TECH. 47, 66 (2004) (arguing that the WTO, as an
institution, should be judged for how it contributes to the accomplishment of basic rights,
human development, health and environmental sustainability goals, rather than simply on the
degree to which it succeeds in promoting trade and investment liberalization. Changes should
be made in WTO agreements when they conflict in any way with the accomplishment of
these and other important norms and goals.).
197. See B.S. Chimni, Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary Analysis,
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 337, 344 (1999) (criticizing the absence of non-state bodies as well, such
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between society and the political institutions which make the rules, and
ensure that they take the effect on others into consideration.198 If interna-
tional rules acknowledge the needs of women in poor populations (poten-
tial suppliers) to be able to provide for their families, it could have the
potential to result in norms that increase women’s bargaining power. It
could change, for example, the priority that international regulation
awards to trade interests over social considerations.
It has been suggested that a locally rooted, bottom-up model could
create networks of stakeholders and join them together in an organization
that efficiently conveys information through social networks and ensures
decent conditions.199 Such a network could represent suppliers’ interests.
In order to truly serve the interest of all groups, coalitions should be aware
of similarities as well as disparities between collaborating populations and
between the causes chosen.200 Not all feminist-motivated struggles would
advance the protection of surrogates, and the same could be said about
other activism, such as labor-oriented struggles. It is also important to note
that the use of suppliers for such purposes is not exploitative in itself, but
promoting, for example, the interests of people who profit from their ser-
vices, such as clinics and mediators who supposedly speak in their name,
could be. The tools for implementation of these mechanisms are left for
future research.
It is important to clarify that even if all of the above-mentioned sug-
gestions are implemented, this does not mean that inequalities will cease
to exist. It is, however, an approach that insists on at least a minimal reali-
zation of equality.
as interest groups and civic organizations, that would represent the impoverished classes).
But see Sangeeta Kamat, The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a
Neo-liberal Era, 11 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 155, 161 (2004) (arguing that the influence that
advocacy NGOs have in international policy forums can be seen to undermine the sover-
eignty of state and international institutions).
198. Cohen, How to Regulate Medical Tourism, supra note 46, at 11 (calling for repre-
sentation of the affected population as part of the process of decision-making). See, e.g.
Chimni, supra note 108, at 13 (suggesting representation of subaltern classes in negotiation
teams by states); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?, 34
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 147, 170 (2006) (suggesting an inclusion of the informal sector in the
ILO decisions).
199. Rittich, supra note 111, at 218-19.
200. Whittaker, supra note 10, at 113 (suggesting that international umbrella organiza-
tions for patients, such as International Consumer Support for Infertility (iCSi), could pre-
sent patients’ perspectives and influence legislation and guidelines on assisted reproduction
services transnationally). On the logics of transnational collaboration, see Vera Mackie, The
Language of Globalization, Transnationality and Feminism, 3 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 180, 194
(2001). For examples of different coalitions and networks that have expressed concern about
the impact of global trade on health services and democracy, and succeeded in preventing
decisions regarding privatization, see Ellen R. Shaffer et al., Global Trade and Public Health,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 23, 32 (2005).
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CONCLUSION
Unilateral action is insufficient to achieve the necessary comprehen-
sive ethical regulation of cross-border reproductive transactions. I have
suggested a shared responsibility model as an alternative theoretical foun-
dation for assigning duties between actors in this system. My goal was not
to abolish these markets, based on the understanding that for practical
reasons it would be better to accept a certain form of the market. Rather,
the model considers a more proportional solution, instead of a solution
that decreases the autonomy of suppliers or limits their opportunity to
profit from such transactions. This is a liberal solution, one that aims to
empower all participants.
The shared responsibility model reflects different voices and chal-
lenges the scope of legal responsibilities, the structure of social institutions
and the norms they create. Attention is paid to whether and how social
factors contribute to the incidence of injustice, in order to distinguish the
different degrees of responsibility of all actors. The model deconstructs the
selective accountability of strong actors and the power concentrated in
their hands and does not dismiss the role indirect actors play. It makes it
possible to assign greater responsibility to those who contribute more to
the unjust situation through direct causal connections, based on empirical
investigations of actions and interactions within the practice and their pro-
motion of unjust results. The obligation has to grow stronger due to the
asymmetric power relations between the parties to the transaction.
I have offered four parallel fields where I believe action is needed:
joint action regarding legal parenthood and the nationality of the child; the
professional field, to ensure universal, proper medical standards; the con-
tractual field, to avoid violating women and children’s rights, as well as a
fair trade model to better divide the benefits of transactions; and, lastly, a
general global commitment to impoverished populations. Every relevant
feature of cross-border reproductive services is examined and responsibil-
ity is assigned accordingly: the meaning of parenthood, the psychological
implications of infertility, existing opportunities for infertile individuals,
background conditions of suppliers, the role of agents, the implications of
reproductive services for suppliers in the context of their life conditions
and legal infrastructure such as the reproductive health policies that regu-
late assisted reproduction, and private trade law. Examining specific areas
of action emphasizes the commonalities among actors, while, at the same
time, leaving states entirely free to regulate or restrict cross-border repro-
ductive transactions in whatever way they deem fit, as long as they respect
these universal minimum safeguards. Duties exist in the realm of repro-
ductive services, whether we categorize transactions as belonging to the
private family sphere or the public market sphere, whether we recognize a
basic global institutional structure, and whether violations of suppliers’
rights qualify as severe human rights violations. These flexibilities make
this model a good option to consider.
